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Horizontal Restraints Under the French
Antitrust Laws:
Competition and Economic Progress
John W. Reboul*
By means of an in-depth study of the decisions of the Commission
technique des ententes Mr. Reboul demonstrates that the concept of
antitrust enforcement in France differs greatly from the approach
employed under American antitrust legislation. Pointing out that the
French antitrust laws are "little known, often ignored, and easily
evaded," the author concludes that the laws have done little to change
the traditional French attitudes toward competition and that the failure
to make a clear choice between repression and control of restrictive
business practices has created inevitable difficulties in enforcement.
I. INTRODUCTION

The French antitrust laws, now more than twelve years old, resist
comparison with those of the United States, and they should not be
approached with the belief that any country that has adopted legislation which speaks of competition has also adopted the American
attitude toward competition.
The attitude that has guided the application of the French antitrust
laws seems to be the new French belief in economic expansion and
active governmental intervention. The French defeat in the war
discredited prewar economic doctrines which emphasized stability,
and there has been an almost universal endorsement of theories of
economic expansion. One commentator went so far as to attribute
the economic recovery in France primarily to "the restaffing of the
economy with new men and to new French attitudes."I
Since the war the government has intervened in the economy with
price controls, nationalizations, long-range programs of economic
planning, and measures of selective promotion and protection. The
* Member of the New York Bar. A.B., Harvard, 1959, L.L.B., 1963, Doctorat de
l'Universit6, University of Paris, 1964. I gratefully acknowledge the invaluable guidance
and assistance of Professor Goldman of the Facult6 de Droit et des Sciences
6conomiques of the University of Paris.

1. KINDLEBERGER, The Postwar Resurgence of the French Economy, in IN SEARCH OF
FnA~cE 156 (1963).

Ehrmann, in 1957, however, described the French attitude as

"a common mentality to which 'measures of protection come to look more attractive
than measures of modernization, and measures of modernization less repelling than
measures of expansion."' EmojANN, ORGANIZED BusnEmsS IN FnANCE 322 (1957),

quoting U.N. ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EuRoPE, EcoNoMnc SuRvEY OF EURoPE IN
1954, at 189, U.N. Doc. No. E/ECE/194, II.E2. (1955).
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French antitrust laws should be viewed as a part of this intervention.
They are not weapons to strike down private agreements so as to
allow competition to regulate the economy.
The aims of this postwar governmental intervention may be suggested by a brief examination of the attitudes of the French Planning
Commission. The Planning Commission has endorsed all measures of
expansion and has tried to make businesses expand faster than they
want to. Immediately after the war, the Planning Commission focused
on plans of group co-operation to modernize several basic industries:
power, transportation, steel, cement, and farm equipment. It was
able to exert considerable pressure since, through its influence in
governmental agencies, industrial projects which it approved were
able to secure investment funds and permission to import necessary
materials and equipment.2 As the initial difficulties of obtaining
financing and imports diminished, the Planning Commission found
itself without this leverage. At the same time, however, businessmen
were accepting the idea of growth through increased investment and
greater efficiency. The Commission then turned to programs of cooperation to encourage the reorganization of the structure of particular
industries, and tried to develop co-ordinated plans for the whole
economy. Although the commentators disagree on how much can
be attributed to the work of the Planning Commission, 3 there is no
doubt that the French recovery has been outstanding. There is voiced,
however, a concern that the Planning Commission is in danger of
automatically accepting industry suggestions, 4 and that the procedure
of group consultation may tend to discourage individual enterprises
which want to expand faster than an industry as a whole.5
Paralleling the present concepts of expansion in France is a distrust
of competition and an apprehensive look back to the dismal economic
performance of the thirties. That period was dominated by what the
French call "Malthusianism," an economic attitude which was primarily characterized by a fear of an overproduction and a collapse
in prices. To avoid this spectre, coalitions were formed to keep
production low and prices high. These practices led toward economic
stagnation and, with the higher prices, tended to close the world
markets to French products. This foreclosure in turn, confirmed the
2. SHEAHAN,
(1963).

PROMOTION AND CONTROL OF INDUSTRY IN POSTWAR FRANCE

170-15

3. Sheahan concludes that the Planning Commission has played a useful role.

Id.

at 181-89. Kindleberger considers that the change in French attitudes was more
important. KnDLEBERCER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 156. Baum believes that the postwar
record of governmental intervention has not been helpful. BATMt, THE FRENcHi EcoNoMY AND T=E STATE 280-81 (1958).
4. SHrAHAN, op. Cit. supra note 2, at 181.
5. Id. at 186.
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fears of overproduction and the Malthusian measures which indus6
trialists and agriculturists had demanded.
There is a tendency in France to cite the thirties as an example of
a period that relied upon competition. Although there was no
directing force other than competition and concentration was unusually low, the period provided no more than a caricature of competitive behavior. Collusive agreements between businesses were widespread and governmental intervention was directed toward protecting
7
existing businesses rather than promoting competition.
Probably the methods used in the postwar governmental interventions are as important to an understanding of the French antitrust
laws as French economic goals. The very multitude of the governmental interventions limits the scope of the economic investigations
upon which each intervention depends and causes the government
to rely upon general economic assumptions and the assistance of trade
associations to implement various projects.
The nature of planning itself demands a willingness to make
recommendations for industries and for the whole economy, often on
the basis of fragmentary information and a series of assumptions. The
Planning Commission, moreover, uses group co-operation for both the
elaboration and implementation of its plans.9
Similar methods are necessary to carry out programs of selective
promotion or price control. The tax advantages provided to encourage
specialization and mergers 10 and the various subsidies granted for
establishment of businesses outside the Paris region" are based more
on the belief that concentration of production and geographical decentralization are beneficial than upon an examination of the facts of
each case. Similarly, with price regulation, the ceiling is determined
from information submitted by sample companies, usually a small,
a medium and a large company. It is only for the especially important
products that agents will be sent to the individual firms to make a
more detailed investigation. Furthermore, since the government is
unable to discuss the establishment of a price with a very large
6.

LALumm RE, L'INSPECnON DES FINANCES

194 (1959),

quoted in KINDLEBERGER,

op. cit. supra note 1, at 141.
7. SHEAHAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 250.

8. Hackett & Hackett note that the trade associations are the principal contact
between the individual firms and the Planning Commission and the major source of
data of all kinds for the committees which participate in the elaboration of the plans.
HACK=aT & HA KLrr, ECONOMIC PLANNING IN FRANCE 172 (1963).
9. SHEAHAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 178-89.
10. See VAssEzu, LE DROrr DE LA REFORME DES STIUCTURES INDUSrRIELLES ET DES
E CONOMIES EGIONALES 381-416 (1959), Norr & Kerlan, Taxation in France (World
Tax Series) 10/9.5-10/9.6 (1966).
11. See VAss=m, op. cit. supra note 10, at 417-22, Norr & Kerlan, op. cit. supra
note 10, at 10/9.9.
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number of separate firms, it is again the trade associations
which
assume the active role in representing the industry.12
It is in the light of these procedures and economic attitudes that
the French antitrust laws and the special advisory body set up to
administer them will be examined.
A reading of the basic statutory prohibitions against restrictive
practices gives a most misleading impression of the effect of the
French antitrust laws and their enforcement by the Commission
technique des ententes et des positions dominantes. The law says
sweepingly that
Subject to the provisions of article 59 ter, all concerted actions, agreements, ententes, express or implied, understandings, or coalitions under whatever form or for whatever reason, which have as their object or may have
as their effect the restriction of the full exercise of competition by placing
an obstacle in the way of a reduction of production costs or sales prices
or by favoring an artificial increase of prices, are prohibited.
Prohibited in a like manner are the activities of an enterprise or of a group
of enterprises occupying a dominant position in the domestic market characterized by a monopoly situation or by a manifest concentration of economic
power, when these activities have for object or may have as their effect the
13
restriction of the normal functioning of the market.

This language seems to make as sweeping a condemnation of
restrictive practices as the Sherman Act, 14 although it is qualified by
the provisions of article 59 ter which allows ententes to escape con-

demnation if it can be shown that they contribute to economic
progress.' 5

12. FRANCK, Las PXix 60-64 (3e 6d. refondue 1964).
13. Decree No. 53-704, Aug. 9, 1953, [1953] Journal Official de la R6publique

Francaise [hereinafter cited as J.O.] 7045, as amended, Decree No. 58-545, June 24,
1958, [1958] J.O. 5877, as amended, Decree No. 59-1004, Aug. 17, 1959, [1959] J.O.

8506, as amended, Law No. 63-628, July 2, 1963, [1963] J.O. 5915, art. 59 bis
[hereinafter cited as article 59 bis]. The other provisions concerning horizontal agree-

ments are contained in articles 59 ter and quater of the same decree. I have used the
French word "entente" for two reasons. First, it does not have the connotations of
such words as "combination," "conspiracy," or "cartel." Second, the breadth and
vagueness of the term is useful. An entente could be defined as an agreement, usually
of a horizontal nature, which could have an effect in a market. The word long antedates
the decree of 1953 and in French it carries no connotation of legality or illegality,
desirability or undesirability. An entente may be between only one or two firms but
most of the ententes examined by the commission have included almost all the manufacturers of a particular product.
The various dispositions of the antitrust laws relating to vertical restrictions will not
be examined in this paper except as they relate to the work of the Commission techniques des ententes. They are contained in Ordinance No. 45-1483, June 30, 1945, art.
37, [1945] J.0. 4150, as amended, Law No. 52-835, July 18, 1952, [1952] J.O. 7227,
as amended, Decree No. 53-704, Aug. 9, 1953, [1953] J.0. 7045, as amended, Decree
No. 58-545, June 24, 1958, [1958] J.O. 5877 [hereinafter cited as article 37].
14. Act of July 2, 1890, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
15. Article 59 ter provides:
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An examination of prior French law shows no antecedent which
might have inspired article 59.16 Furthermore, the legislative history
represented by a series of bills proposed between 1947 and 1953
shows conflicting attitudes toward competition and the establishment
of an antitrust law.' 7
In 1953 following a parlimentary crisis, the government was
granted the power to legislate by decree for certain limited purposes
"The provisions of article 59 bis do not relate to the concerted actions, agreements or
ententes, or the activities of an enterprise or of a group of enterprises occupying a
dominant position:
(1) Which result from the application of a legislative provision or a regulation;
(2) Which the originators are able to justify as having the effect of improving or
extending the outlets of production, or of assuring the development of economic
progress by means of rationalization and specialization."
The Commission often refers to the various programs that permit an entente to benefit
from the exemption of article 59 ter as 'justifications."'
16. FRENCH PENAL CODE art. 419 provides that "all persons:
"1. Who by false or slanderous facts willfully disseminated among the public, by
offers made with the intention to disturb prices, by offers made in excess of prices
demanded by the sellers themselves, by any fraudulent means whatever;
2. Or who in exercising or in attempting to exercise either individually or by a
group or coalition, an action on the market with the purpose of procuring a gain
which would not be obtainable by the normal interplay of offer and demand,
Shall have directly or indirectly, effected, or attempted to effect an artificial increase
or decrease in price of food products, merchandise, negotiable instruments or government securities,
Shall be punished by an imprisonment of from two months to two years and a
fine of from 7200 francs to 360,000 francs. The perpetrator may, furthermore, be
restricted in his freedom of movement for no less than two, nor more than five years."
Article 419 has received a very limited application, usually only small local
arrangements that one author has characterized as "Balzacian" have been punished.
REuTER, A PROPOS DES ENTENTES INDUSTRIELLES ET COMMERCIALES, [1953] DRoIT
SOCrAL [hereinafter cited as DR. soc.] 1,4. The various manoeuvres condemned by
article 419 "seem to have finally been interpreted as a sort of moral disapproval condeming the most shocking procedures and results. The courts have developed on the basis of
article 419 and imprecise distinction between good and bad ententes. The latter are
those which use fraudulent means or exact excessive profits. The good ententes, on the
other hand, can flourish under the protection of article 419, and it is clear that the
most serious ententes do not risk using the manoeuvres that characterize the bad
ententes. Essentially the courts have tried to develop a standard of normal conduct
for a merchant. The reasonable man, normally honest and skillful, is placed in the
context of ententes. It would not be paradoxical to allege that the most dangerous
ententes are probably those which best conform to this standard." LoussouAumr &
Bammn, LA IuEGLEMENTATION DES ENTENTES: LE RECUL DU CONTROLE JUDICIAIRE, [1963]
RECuErr DALLOZ [hereinafter cited as D.] chr. 33, 33-34. Ehrmann remarked in relation

to article 419 that "a highly placed official of the Ministry of Justice had explained that
a modem entente would have to show an unusual amount of ineptness to invite judicial
action against it." EnaMANN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 381. For an analysis of many
of the cases which have arisen under article 419, see BLAisE, LE STATUT JURMIQUE DES
ENTENTES i-CONOMIQUES DANS LE DROrr FRANCAIS ET LE DRorr DES COMmuNAuris
EurmoPiENNEs 181-97, 342-57 (1964).
17. See MoREAu & M*iiGOT, LES ENTENTES PROFESSIONNELLES DEVANT LA LOI, LA
DOCUMENTATION FRANCAISE, ENTENTES ET MONOPOLES DANS LE MONDE, France No.
1736 (1953), SoULEAu, LA REGLEMENTATION DES ENTENTES PROFESSIONNELLES DANS
LE D]-CRET-LOI DU 9 AOUT 1953, [1953] DR. SOC. 577.
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and in its exercise of these powers, articles 59 and 37 were promulgated. 8
In its first report, the Commission technique des ententes gave its
interpretation of the draftsmen's intention. 19 After stressing the modest
and nonrevolutionary character of the law, it said that
Using and adapting the ideas which emerged from the long discussion
and important legislative consideration, the draftsmen of the Decree of
August 9, 1953 have chosen the ideas, if not the easiest, at least the simplest
to put into application. Faced with the difficulty of drafting a law, the
draftsmen seem to have wanted to propose to the legislature and to the
country an experiment intended to introduce a new type of legislation,
of which even the idea had aroused serious apprehension in important
20
circles.

The Commission has treated the laws as such an experiment and has
not considered itself bound by any strong policy in favor of competition which initially might seem to be contained in the statute. It
does not invariably favor competition, and is little worried by mono18. Law No. 53-611, July 11, 1953, [1953] J.0. 6143. This law provided, at art. 7
that the government could take measures relative to the maintenance or re-establishment
of free industrial and commercial competition. Since the government had not been
given the power to modify the penal law, articles 59 and 37 were inserted into the
basic laws regulating prices so that the penalties for violating this ordinance would be
applicable to violations of the antitrust laws. Ordinance No. 45-1483, June 30, 1945,
[1945] J.0. 4150; Ordinance No. 45-1484, June 30, 1945, [1945] J.0. 4156. The
validity of this legislative procedure was challenged and two articles of the Decree of
Aug. 9, 1953 which related to article 37, were declared void by the Conseil d'Etat.
Syndicat des grossistes en mat~riel 6lectrique de la r6gion Provence, June 18, 1958,
[1958] Recueil des arr~ts du Conseil d Etat 358, [1958] D.II 656, [1958] Semaine
Juridique [hereinafter cited as J.C.P.] 11.107.27. Since the case did not directly concern
article 59 except in relation to the sanctions which could be imposed for its violation, it
might be argued that the special investigative procedure set up under article 59 was
not affected. The argument however is without importance as six days after the
decision of the Conseil d'Etat, the government issued a new decree which reproduced,
with a few minor changes, the articles of the decree of August 9, 1953 which had
been annulled. Decree No. 58-545, June 24, 1958, [19581 J.0. 5877. The legality of
this decree has been upheld several times. E.g., Nicolas, Soci6t6 Brandt et Socit6
Photo Radio Club, Cour de Cassation (Ch. Crim.), July 11, 1962, [1962] Bulletin des
arr~ts de la Cour de Cassation, Chambre criminelle [hereinafter cited as Bull. crim.]
504, [1962] D.II. 497, [1962] J.C.P. II. 12799. The annulment had no effect on
the procedure under article 59 as there were no criminal proceedings pending. TouTmr'E
LEs

ENTENTES

PROFFSsIONmNELs,

[1960]

CONSEn.

D'

ETAT, ETUDEs

Lr DOCUMENTS

161, 168.
19. Rapport de la commission technique des ententes pour les ann~es 1954 et 1955
[hereinafter cited as first report], [1960] J.O., Documents administratifs [hereinafter
cited as Doe. adm.] 1,2. (The first four reports have been reprinted in brochure no.
1193 and the latest report in brochure no. 1193-64 by the Journaux Oflciels.) The
President of the Commission writes a general discussion of its activities to accompany
each group of cases published. Any citation to a report without the designation of a
particular case will be in reference to these remarks.

20. Ibid.
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polies or dominant firms. No matter how large a French company
grows, the commission believes that the risks of abuse will usually be
curbed by competition from the rest of the Common Market.
What the Commission technique des ententes seems to desire is for
French businesses to improve their competitive position in the world
and the Common Market. To attain this goal, the Commission has
adopted two policies. First, it approves agreements among the members of an industry to institute programs of modernization. Secondly,
it encourages the reorganization of the structure of French industry.
Believing that French companies are almost always too small to be
efficient, the Commission approves all measures toward mergers and
concentration of production.
Competition may serve a useful purpose, but it is approached with
distrust and frequently with the feeling that the poor economic
performance of the thirties was a result of leaving the market to be
regulated by competition alone. In an expanding industry, the Commission fears that competition may discourage long-range plans of
investment which would be carried out if firms were allowed to join
together and thus be assured that each company would temporarily
retain its share of the market.21 In a declining industry, the Commission fears that competition will lead to price wars until eventually
one or two strong firms emerge, which will then try to offset their
losses by exacting monopoly profits. Competition is thus relegated
to the minor position of providing some limitation on prices and helping to eliminate the most inefficient firms.
This article attempts to define the criteria used by the Commission technique des ententes in judging restrictive practices and to
evaluate the importance of the French antitrust laws in the French
economy. The procedure before the Commission will first be considered. Next, the justifications which the Commission has accepted
will be examined, since it is through an analysis of these justifications,
rather than an examination of the practices disapproved by the Commission, that the economic theories of the Commission become
apparent. Then, after a consideration of the prohibited practices,
the relationship of the French antitrust laws to other laws which
may affect competition will be analyzed. Finally, the problems of
the application of the French antitrust laws, and the relationship
between the Commission and the courts will be considered.
21. The Commission has paid little attention to the problem of defining particular
markets. It seems to be generally willing to accept as the relevant market that portion
of one or more markets which have been tied up by the particular restrictive practice
under consideration.
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II. PiROCEDUE BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The Commission technique des ententes,22 a special advisory tribu-

nal to the Minister for Economic Affairs, plays the most important role
in the enforcement of article 59. Largely on the basis of an extensive
documentation which has been submitted to it, the Commission formulates a series of recommendations which the Minister will consider in
deciding whether to reach a settlement with an entente or to institute
criminal proceedings.
After the government's attention has been initially drawn to the
23
existence of an entente, the Service for Economic Investigations
conducts an extensive examination of the industry in question. These
investigations, lasting several months, are carried out by two persons
who visit the trade associations and most of the companies in an
industry.' The report which is then prepared is one of the essential
elements in the case and generally is accepted as its factual basis.
These administrative reports, which run from 70 to 150 pages in
length and may contain various appendices, usually start with a brief
description of the industry, including a summary of the technological
problems, the prices charged, the volume of production, and the
principal uses of the product. Then, in the most important part of
the administrative report, a detailed examination is made of the
22. The members of the Commission are named by the agreement of the Minister
for Economic Affairs, the Minister for Industry and Commerce, and the Minister of
Justice. Six of the members are chosen from the judiciary and the administration,
six represent management and labor and two are selected because of their economic
knowledge. Decree No. 54-97, Jan. 27, 1954, [1954] J.O. 1004, as amended, Decree
No. 59-1004, Aug. 17, 1959, [1959] J.O. 8506 [hereinafter cited as Decree of Jan. 27,
1954] art. 1. For the present membership see, Decree No. 59-1004, Aug. 17, 1959,
[1959] J.0. 8506 to which should be added the names of M. Plescoff, directeur financier
of the Caisse de D6p8ts et Consignations and M. Blot, sous-governeur of the Cr6dit
Foncier de France. The members of the Commission are not paid.
23. This service is part of the Direction g6n&ale du commerce int6rieur et des prix
one of whose most important jobs is the enforcement of the price control legislation. See

generally

SouLE~u, LEs REGLES PARTicuLnmE,

REP,,ssION ETABLIES PAR L'ORDONNANCE

DE CONSTATION, DE POURSUITE ET DE

n. 45-1484 du 30 juin 1945, Junis-CLAssEuit

P .NAL, Lois PiENALES ANNEXES, INFRACTIONS ECONOMINQUES,

I., 10-139.

24. The facts concerning the investigations made by the Commission and the documents such as the administrative reports, the ministerial letters conferring jurisdiction
on the Commission, and the memoranda of the reporters were gathered in a series of
interviews carried out in Paris in 1964. Members of the Service for Economic Investigations, and the Commission were questioned as well as executives of companies and
trade associations and many of the various documents prepared during these investigations were examined.
The proceedings before the Commission are officially declared to be secret, Decree of
Jan. 27, 1954, art. 19, and the publication of its opinions was only authorized in 1959,
Decree No. 59-1004, Aug. 17, 1959, [1959] J.0. 8506. Because of this confidential
nature and the request of some of those who have been kind enough to furnish information, precise citations will not always be given. Any citation without exact indication of
authority, however, should be understood to refer to information gathered from these
interviews and documents.
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various trade associations, common sales agencies, stock holdings
and contracts which may link the different producers. In conclusion,
the question of whether there has been a violation of the antitrust
laws is briefly considered. The existence of these remarks, however,
should not obscure the fact that the primary purpose of the report
is to provide a basic summary of the economic situation.
Next, the Minister for Economic Affairs decides whether the case
should be dropped or sent to the Commission for its examination.1

In the period from 1960 to 1964, the latter alternative was adopted
in slightly more than half the cases. The Minister confers jurisdiction
on the Commission by means of a letter which briefly summarizes
the situation as revealed by the report of the Service for Economic
Investigations, and outlines the questions which the Commission
should examine.2 6 This grant of jurisdiction is quite flexible, and the
Commission has felt free to extend its investigations beyond the
Minister's questions.27
The Commission, however, has felt that an insufficient number of

investigations were being carried out. It noted that at the end of
1962, there were only five cases pending, four of which were re-

examinations of ententes already considered,

and it declared that

This situation cannot continue without inconvenience. It is surely very
useful to be able to follow the evolution of the practices of ententes
previously studied and to thus perfect both the recommendations for a
particular case and also the case law of the Commission. It would be most
unfortunate, however, if the opinions of the Commission, the appreciations
25. If the Commission has not rendered a decision within a period of six months or
in case of urgency, repeated offense, or flagrant violation the Minister can transmit the
case directly to the public prosecutor. Art. 59 quater. This power has never been
used although the Commission has not often observed the six-month time limit.
26. The normal procedure is for the Minister for Economic Affairs to bring a case
before the Commission, see Decree of Jan. 27, 1954, art. 4, first report 4. The Commission also has power to take a case on its own. Decree of Jan. 27, 1954, art. 4. This
power has rarely been used and once when the Commisson had decided independently
to take a case, it referred the case to the Service for Economic Investigations for a
preliminary examination. Rapport de la commission technique des ententes pour les
ann6es 1958 et 1959 [hereinafter cited as fourth report], [1961] J.0., Doc. adm. 303,
304. The Minister of Justice, on a request of the public prosecutor, also may and
occasionally has, brought a case before the commission. Decree of Jan. 27, 1954, art.
4; see, e.g., Entente dans l'industrie du savon de m6nage, first report 8. Private
individuals have no right to bring a case before the Commission, but cases have
been considered after requests to the Commission or the Minister. E.g., first report
4, Entente dans l'industrie de r6paration du mat6riel roulant ferroviaire, fourth report
315.
27. Rapport de ]a commission technique des ententes pour 1'ann6e 1957 [hereinafter cited as third report], [1960] J.0., Doc. adm. 211, 212.
28. Rapport de la commission technique des ententes pour 'anndes 1960, 1961 et
1962 [hereinafter cited as fifth report], [1964] J.0., Doc. adm. 9, 10. See also fourth
report 304.
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and suggestions of every kind that they may contain, the action preventative
or curative more than repressive that they may permit, are confined to a
limited number of sectors of the national economy.29

Although the Commission stated that it did not plan to use its powers
to initiate proceedings, it asked the Service for Economic Investigation to undertake investigations in new sectors of the economy. The

Commission also requested that a larger budget be provided for the
investigations of violations of the antitrust laws.30
The Service for Economic Investigations has expressed its awareness
of this problem but noted that there were no plans for a marked
increase in the less than twenty persons concerned with questions of
ententes. The situation, however, does seem to have improved, and
during the 1964-1965 term the Commission was scheduled to examine
nine ententes, five of which were in industrial sectors which previously
had not been examined.
The procedure before the Commission is based largely upon that
of the French administrative courts. 31 The Commission does not
remain passive and permit the government or the members of the
entente under investigation to control the course of the case by a
long oral presentation and the submission of numerous exhibits.
Rather it actively directs the elaboration of the case and appoints a
reporter to make an investigation. The modest part played by the
persons actually accused of violating the antitrust laws is surprising
to those who are accustomed to American antitrust suits.
The examination starts when the President of the Commission ap-

points a reporter2 to make a second analysis of the industry. This
investigation does not overlap the earlier administrative one, since
the reporter's primary role is to analyze the factual situation exposed
in the administrative report. However, he is also expected to spot
check these findings and talk to the trade associations, the most
.important producers, and the largest clients. He will also consult with
the reporter general.33 Such consultation is necessary to preserve a
certain continuity since the reporter often may have had no previous
29. Fifth report 10.

30. Ibid.

31. For the procedure before the French administrative courts see VEDEL, Dnorr
ADmINmsT:aAF 382-411 (3e 6d, refondue 1964).
. 32. Decree of Jan. 27, 1954, art. 7. The reporters are chosen among middle level
governmental officials from such bodies as the Conseil d'Etat, the Inspection g6n6rale
des finances and the Commissariat g6n6ral aux prix. Decree of Jan. 27, 1954, art. 3.
33. The designation of a reporter general, and possibly also of an assistant, is
provided for in the decree regulating the procedure of the Commission. Decree of
Jan. 27, 1954, art. 3. The reporter general and his assistant have a permanent position
in comparison with the regular reporters who are often named for the examination of
a single case.
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experience in the antitrust field.3 The report, after briefly summarizing the factual situation as presented by the administrative
report, concentrates on an analysis of whether article 59 bis has been
violated and if so, whether the entente can be justified under article
59 ter.
The reporter's examination, and to a lesser extent that of the Service
for Economic Investigations, is characterized by extended negotiations
between the companies and the investigator. The Commission has
noted that often the parties under investigation, instead of taking
a firm position, prefer to listen to the reporter's suggestions in order
to eliminate certain restrictive practices or to implement various
programs which could contribute to economic progress.3 In one case,,
the Commission said that this co-operation prompted it to make
moderate recommendations, as it believed that the members of the
entente would implement the promised technical programs.3 6
The reporter's memorandum is then made available to the interested parties for their comments.3 7 The parties, however, have not
made extensive use of this right of reply. Their comments are usually
from two to five pages in length, and may only state that the
reporter has fairly described the entente and the industry. When the
parties' comments are received, they are sent together with the re-,
porter's memorandum to the various governmental ministries which
may be interested in the case.8
Before the actual meeting of the Commission, each member is
sent an extensive documentation which includes all the documents
discussed and a draft opinion prepared by the reporter. The members
of the Commission may also consult with the reporter, but this is
rarely done. The right to hold ex parte conversations is not unusual
in French law, since judges of administrative tribunals are not bound
by the type of restrictions imposed under United States rules on
judicial investigation. Moreover, the reporter has the right to vote
34. The Commission has often complained about the difliculty of finding reporters.
E.g., first report 7. Originally a list of about forty names was established but the

Commission found that most of these persons were almost permanently unavailable.
Ibid. Now the reporters are designated on a case-by-case basis.
35. Rapport de la commission technique des ententes pour I'ann4e 1956 [hereinafter
cited as second report], [1960] J.O., Doc. adm. 15, 16.
36. Third report 213, quoting Entente entre fabricants de verre plat, third report
218.
37. Decree of Jan. 27, 1954, art. 9. After the first few years, the administrative
reports ceased to be made available officially to the persons being investigated because
of the feeling that since they contained sales figures and other information about
companies under investigation, they should not be made available generally to the
industry. The members of the ententes, however, in general, manage to obtain a
detailed knowledge of this report and often procure a copy.
38. Decree of Jan. 27, 1954, art. 10.
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on the disposition of the case which he has investigated. 39
The actual meetings of the Commission are quite brief, a case
will usually be disposed of in one session of three or four hours.40 The
reporter opens with a few remarks about the industry or a summary
of his memorandum. The reporter general and his assistant follow
with their observations. A representative of the Minister for Economic
Affairs then presents the comments of the various governmental
agencies which may be interested in the case.4 1 The Commission
then has the discretion to call in anyone else it may find useful,
including the interested parties.42 This option, however, has been
used infrequently and parties have not been heard in more than four
or five cases. The refusal to grant parties the right either to an oral
hearing or to observe the proceedings of a court is not unusual in
French law. Before the Conseil d'Etat, for example, parties may hear
nothing about their case from the time their briefs are submitted
to the court until a largely formal hearing is held near the end
of the case, at which the parties rarely do more than refer the court
43
to their written memoranda.
The meeting of the Commission is then open to general discussion,
and finally to a consideration of the reporter's draft opinion. The
decision is reached by a majority vote with the President's vote
being decisive in case of an equal division. 44 In fact, the decisions
are usually supported by 12 or 13 of the 15 votes.
This procedure depends very much on the studies made by the
Service for Economic Investigations and the reporter. The conclusions
of the reporter and reporter general would seem very influential. One
will have made a detailed investigation and the other will be familiar
with the development of the case. The members of the Commission
are not expected to have done more than read the reporter's memorandum and possibly have skimmed some of the other documents before
the fairly brief discussion at the meetings. The reporter's influence
is probably also increased by the lack of clearly articulated standards
under the French antitrust laws. In fact, the draft opinions are
adopted 80 to 85 per cent of the time, although often extensively
revised on stylistic grounds. The opinions which the Commission
then renders are equivalent in length to about four typewritten pages.
39. He did not originally have this power but it was accorded in 1958. Decree No.
58-545, June 24, 1958, [1958] J.O. 5877.
40. These meetings are not open to the public. Decree of Jan. 27, 194, art. 12.
41. Art. 59 quater.
42. When the interested parties are called, they should appear personally and do
not have the right to be represented by counsel. Third report 213.
43. Harmson, Le conseil d'Etat statuant au contentieux, 68 L.Q. REv. 60, 79 (1952).
44. Art. 59 quater, Decree of Jan. 27, 1954, art. 14.
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While generally comparable to those handed down by French courts,
they do not approach the detailed discussions of the legal issues and
relevant facts which are usually present in the opinions in American
antitrust cases. This brevity is unfortunate because it limits the use
of the opinions by other companies trying to determine whether the
practices in which they are engaged are legal. While the Commission's
disapproval of particular restrictive practices, such as price fixing,
may appear clearly, it is extremely difficult to ascertain the nature and
extent of the programs favorable to economic progress which the
Commission has accepted as justifications of ententes. The Commisundercut its often expressed objective to
sion has thus partially
45
develop a case law.
The opinions are generally programs for expansion or reorganization
of an industry, or that part of it represented by members of an
entente. The Commission apparently does not believe that the
provisions of articles 59 bis and ter call for two separate findings
(one of the existence of a restriction on competition and the other
of the extent of the programs which favor economic progress), and.
then a decision as to whether the entire entente should be condemned
or approved. It seems to treat article 59 bis almost as a rule of jurisdiction and it has nearly always found that, in the terms of the statute,
the ententes under examination have as their object, or may have as
their effect, a restriction on the full exercise of competition by placing
an obstacle in the way of reducing production costs or sales prices
or by favoring an artificial increase of prices.
The bulk of the opinions consists of what the Commission calls an
economic balance sheet 6 of the desirable and undesirable elements
of the entente under consideration. The Commission will not then
conclude simply that an entente is legal or illegal. Instead, an
entente may be considered as justifiable for the present, but future
legality will be conditioned upon its continuation of particular programs of specialization or standardization. Or, an entente may be
declared illegal but be allowed a certain period in which to abolish
particular restrictive practices or implement a program for the reorganization of the industry.
The opinion is sent as a recommendation to the Minister, who will
decide such matters as what restrictive practices should be abandoned
by the parties or what plans of technical development should be
undertaken. He prepares a letter to the members of the entente telling them what they should do to avoid criminal proceedings. 47 The
45. E.g., second report 16.
46. E.g., first report 6.
47. See Decree of Jan. 27, 1954, art. 17. These letters, which are published along
with the Commission's opinions, are often referred to as ministerial decisions although

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 19

general tone of these letters is more severe than the opinions of the
Commission but there is little substantive difference.48
The ministerial decisions may bring the broad investigation of the
Commission into clearer focus through an examination of the different
programs needed for the various sectors of an industry which was
.considered only generally by the Commission, 49 or may add conditions
generally in harmony with the Commission's recommendations such
-as forbidding the circulation of suggested price lists 50 The Minister
has also questioned general assumptions of the Commission in a way
that should be useful in reaching a more workable body of law. For
example, he has asked for a reconsideration of the need for longterm quota agreements in connection with specialization agreements. 51
III.

JUSTIFICATION OF RESTRICTIVE PRAcTciCEs

The justifications that the Commission seeks can be roughly divided

into two categories, technical and organizational.52 The former look
*the only choice the Minister has is to reach an agreement with the entente or send
the case to the public prosecutor. The Commission has never recommended criminal
prosecution and the Minister has never sent a case to the public prosecutor. The
public prosecutor would still be free, if the Minister requested prosecution, to reach
his own decision as to what action to take, for example to prosecute the entente for
the violation of another law than article 59 or to drop the case. See Ordinance No.
45-1484, June 30, 1945, [1945] J.0. 4156, as amended, Law No. 65-549, July 9,
1965, [1965] .0. 5915, art. 19. SoULEAu, PRAnTQUES ANTICONCUrrENTIELLES ET
AUTRES

INFRACTIONS

ASSLMILEES

A

DE Pix
ILLICITE, Julus-CLAssEulI
CONOMIQUES, III, 166.

LA PRATIQUE

PiNAL, Lois P.NALiES ANNEXES, INFRACnONS

48. The President of the Commission has noted that there has been no difference
of principle on legal or economic grounds between the Commission and the Minister
for Economic Affairs. TouriE, op. cit. supra note 18, at 170-71.
49. For example, in a case involving the manufacturers of bicycle parts, the
Minister noted that the fabrication of rims was relatively concentrated, though there was
an excessive number of different types, while the manufacture of handle bars was
overly dispersed. Entente entre fabricants de jantes et de guidons, fourth report 310
(ministerial decision). The Commission bad only noted the need for specialization and
standardization in the industry. Entente entre fabricants de jantes et de guidons,
fourth report 309.
50. Entente entre fabricants de bandes transporteuses en caoutchouc, fourth report
313.
51. Entente entre fabricants de fils et cables 6lectriques isol6s, second report 27
(ministerial decision), Entente entre fabricants de demi-produits en m6taux cuivreux,
fourth report 308 (ministerial decision).
52. The Commission has not limited itself to consider only those justifications
expressly mentioned in Article 59 ter, 2' ("having the effect of improving or extending
the outlets of production, or of assuring the development of economic progress by
means of rationalization and specialization"). Second report 18. It has stated that it
has also allowed as justifications "the creation of conditions which favored the concentration of enterprises, . . . the improved coordination of investments, the more
rational use of labor, and the improvement in the quality of products, etc." Ibid. The
president of the Commission has remarked that the Commission had interpreted the
reference to rationalization and specialization as examples of measures contributing to
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toward research, standardization and specialization, and the latter
toward mergers and concentration of production to form units of
efficient size. Of course, there is much overlap between these two
categories as, for example, a specialization agreement is a method
of permitting firms, without increasing their individual sizes, to increase the scale of their production of particular products.
A second division could be made between agreements at the level
of production and those at the stage of sales and distribution. While
the Commission looks severely on price fixing and other agreements
tying up the sales or distribution processes, the decline in competition
which may result from a concentration of production facilities or a
specialization agreement seems to be of no concern so long as there
is some check on market power, such as the existence of one other
large producer,5 3 the threat of import competition,5 4 the countervailing power of a large buyer,5 5 or even the presence of price
control. 56
The division between technical and organizational programs, however, will be used in the examination of the justifications which the
Commission has accepted under article 59 ter. The distinction between those agreements at the level of production and those at the
stage of distribution should not be forgotten, and it will be seen that
most of the justifications accepted by the Commission occur at the
level of production and most of the practices which are condemned
involve distribution.
The principle of allowing restrictive practices to be justified by
various technical and organizational programs assumes, of course, that
free competition is not the best regulator of the market. This assumption, which is fundamental to all the French post-war governmental
interventions, also forms the basis of the Commission's interpretation
of article 59 ter. The Commission seems to believe that organization
of an industrial section by an entente is normally beneficial and that
it should only intervene if the practices can be shown to be undesirable.
Two practical effects should also be pointed out. First, that the
Commission seems to have adopted a series of assumptions, such
as the desirability of concentration of production, which are not
re-examined in the light of each factual situation. Second, faced
with almost impossible questions, such as whether an industry would
economic progress and that it had accepted as justification any measures which lead
to such an end. Tout6e, op. cit. supra note 18, at 176.
53. E.g., Entente entre fabricants de lampes 6lectriques, second report 22.
54. E.g., Entente entre fabricants de raccords en fonte mall6able, fifth report 20.
55. E.g., Entente dans 1industrie de r6paration du mat6riel roulant ferroviaire, foui'th
report 315.
56. E.g., Entente dans l'industrie des tuyaux en fonte, fifth report 29.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 19

have made larger investments for research if there had been no
entente, the Commission has not demanded a rigorous proof, but
seems to have relied more on a general appreciation of whether the
industry appeared to be sufficiently modem and progressive. This
approach is also dictated by the procedure under article 59 which
combines two relatively limited investigations, one by agents of
the Service for Economic Investigations and the other by the reporter, with a brief, rapid examination of the case by the Commission.
A. Programsfor TechnicalProgress
The Commission favors programs of research and development, but
seems to attach more importance to specialization and standardization
agreements. While great stress is placed on research, it is regarded as
something which can be best accomplished by joint efforts rather than
as a matter for competition. In the Abrasives"7 case the Commission
found that the technical independence of the industry was not assured,
since the largest producer used the research department of its parent,
a foreign corporation, and only one French company had its own
laboratory. It remarked that it would have been appropriate for the
entente to have promoted an agreement of the small and medium
sized firms to set up common research facilities.5
The Plate Glass59 case would seem to provide an extreme example of
this desire to achieve cooperation in research. One of the largest
French corporations, Saint-Gobain, and Boussois, another large firm,
accounted for about 90 per cent of the French production and were
also in dominant positions in the Common Market. From information
secured from a source within the industry, it appears that the reporter
was aware of the important research laboratories possessed by each
company, and that he was willing to concede that this technical rivalry
had its advantages in preventing the industry from becoming static.
However, he apparently concluded in his report that this competition
had led to an excessive proliferation of special products such as
insulating glass and safety glass and that it would have been preferable if the producers had used their research facilities in common
to develop standardized products rather than duplicating their efforts
to promote rival products destined for the same use. Though the
Commission did not consider the question, the Minister declared
that "it would be desirable, as far as it is compatible with the continuance of the independence of the two principle companies, to
57. Entente entre fabricants de meules et produits abrasifs agglom6r6s, first report
13.

58. ibid.

59. Entente entre fabricants de verre plat, third report 218.
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reduce to a minimum the duplication which can arise in research." 60
While one might well adopt the attitude of the Commission
technique des ententes and the Planning Commission6 ' that in dispersed industries centralization of research is necessary to keep up
with technical advances and international competition, the theory
of the present case seems to reject the idea of any competition in
research.
Standardization and specialization agreements are often directed
toward the same end: to limit the number of products made by each
firm so that each will be able to produce more efficiently and at a
lower cost. The emphasis on specialization is partially a result of a
belief that the units of French business are too small and too diversified. The role of the size of business units in economic growth will
be discussed later in connection with the French attitude toward
concentration and mergers.62 It should be noted now, however, that
many of the objections to the small firm are based on the lack of
efficiency of production methods. Technical advances are often hampered by the attitude that manufacturers should try to preserve customers by diversifying to fill every requirement of an existing
customer, rather than trying to gain new markets for a specialized
line of products. 63 Specialization agreements are useful to reverse
this tendency and permit larger scale production without reducing
the number of finns in an industry.
In two cases involving agricultural hand tools, the Commission
examined an industry in which demand had fallen sharply with the
growing mechanization of agriculture. In the first case, 64 although
disapproving the provisions concerning prices and quotas, it approved
the efforts toward specialization and standardization. Two companies had abandoned the manufacture of forks and hooks, and, of
the remaining four, there were only two, and exceptionally three firms
which made each model. The measures of standardization were
equally modest. The Commission noted that, following an agreement
among the entente members, the number of different types of forks
and hooks had been reduced from 82 basic and 165 derivative models
60. Id. at 220 (ministerial decision).
61. E.g., for the transformation industries,

COMMISSARIAT G-N RAL
QUAThMME PLAN DE DEVELOPPEMENT iCONOMIQU Er SOCLI. (1962-1965)

DU

PLAN,

at 381-82
(1962). The transformation industries include mechanical and electrical engineering
and textiles which account for well over three quarters of the total output, but other
businesses such as leather goods, paper, plastics, toys and even dry cleaning are also
represented, HAcsm-rr & HAcKb-r, op. cit. supra note 8, at 170.
62. See text accompanying notes 79-105 infra.
63. See SHEAHAw, PNOMOTON AND CONTROL OF INDUSTRY IN PosTwAR FRANCE 153
(1963), VAsSEur, op. cit. supra note 10, at 20.
64. Ententes entre fabricants d'outils agricoles A main, third report 216.
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to 74 basic and 137 derivative models.65 With the limited number of
different types of these tools and the relative ease of changing from
the manufacture of one type of model to another, these measures
would probably not increase the scale of production of each company.
However, they would not noticeably reduce competition.
Four years later, the Commission returned to its examination of the
agreements among the manufacturers of forks and hooks.66 It found
a continuation of the modest technical programs which had improved
the efficiency of production. The number of models had been reduced
to a total of 172, the number of producers to three, and in most cases
only one firm made each model. The Commission, however, adopted a
more severe attitude toward the entente stating that these technical
programs, which seem wholly comparable to those examined in the
earlier cases did not justify the restrictive practices. 67
Measures of standardization and specialization would seem most
useful in dispersed industries with numerous firms making practically
identical products. The Commission, however, has looked for
standardization and specialization in all industries. In the Light
Bulb Base6 8 case the Commission considered the legality of a specialization agreement in which three of the four producers decided that
each would henceforth limit itself to the manufacture of a particular
type of base. As a measure to guard against the risks of these changes,
the companies had also agreed that these products would be exchanged among themselves at a special rate and sold to the public at
a common price. The Commission recognized that the agreement gave
each of the three a quasi-monopolistic position. This monopoly power
was, moreover, increased by the fact that the fourth company was an
integrated manufacturer producing essentially for its own use. However, it approved the agreement believing the measures of specialization had permitted, by efforts in retooling and technical reorganization,
and in spite of the high cost of labor and raw materials, a lowering of
prices nearer to those of similar foreign products. 9
Returning again to the Plate Glass"° case, the Commission listed
65. The lack of standardization in the industry has been a continuing problem and
Vasseur cites an investigation carried out in 1938 which disclosed that there were 1300
models of agricultural forks and that it was estimated that if this number was reduced
to 40 the production cost could be halved. VAssnun, op. cit. Supra note 10, at 20.
66. Entente entre fabricants de fourches et crocs, fifth report 35.
67. The change in attitude can also be attributed to the fact that the restrictive
practices which the commission had condemned four years earlier had hardly been
modified in the interval. Ibid.
68. Entente entre fabricants de culots de lamps 6lectriques, second report 23.
69. Ibid. The Commission treated in a similar fashion specialization agreements
between dominant companies in Ententes dans rindustrie des tubes d'acier, fifth report
16; Entente entre fabricants de raccords en fonte mall6able, fifth report 20.
70. Entente entre fabricants de verre plat, third report 218.
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among the justifying factors under article 59 ter certain specialization
agreements which had limited the production of certain special
products to a single company. As well as providing another example
of approval by the Commission of a further diminution of competition in an industry already dominated by two companies, this
statement raises questions as to the technique by which the Commission establishes its justifications. From information gathered from
members of the industry, it seems that the degree of specialization
was very slight and that it had actually declined in the sixteen
months preceding the examination of the case. It appears also that
the reporter was well aware of these facts and pointed them out to
the Commission.
An examination of the technical programs approved by the Commission shows that it has a very limited belief in competition. Its
general approach seems to be to allow restrictive practices unless
they can be shown to have harmful results, not to strike them down
unless they can be shown to have a valid purpose.
The Commission has often held it to the credit of an entente that
it has managed to create a climate of confidence favorable to increased productivity7 ' or to specialization. 2 It is also willing to allow
members of an industry to stablize their market shares through
quota agreements as a prerequisite to the implementation of various
technical programs, since it apparently believes that manufacturers
often will not take the risks of programs such as specialization
unless they are guaranteed a certain share of the future market
through quota agreements.7 3
Beyond all questions of choice of standards, the procedure of
balancing the good and bad elements of an entente create incredibly
difficult factual issues. Enterprises will always allege, and in any
reasonably progressive industry will be able to show, such developments as new patents, increased standardization or specialization.
The Commission has frequently said that it will isolate the
contribution of the entente and will compare the entente's real effect
with the situation that would probably have resulted from free
71. E.g., Entente entre fabricants de fils et cables 6lectriques isol6s, second report 25.
72. E.g., Entente dans l'industrie des verres d'optique mddicale et de lunetterie, fifth
report 31.
73. E.g., Entente entre fabricants de demi-produits en m6taux cuivreux, fourth report
307. See generally the article of Termont, the president of a company of French industrial consultants, who states that for specialization it is necessary that there be agreements to guarantee to each company its share of the market and its price. L'dvolution
des ententes professionneles, in ENTENTEs, FUSIONS, ACTIONS COLLECTIVES (EXPiRMNCES
D. COLLABORATON n IR-ENT7lUSES)

32, 38 (1962).

He also notes that ententes

could freely use all clauses which restrained competition when they contributed directly
and essentially to the realization of goals wished by the Commission technique des
ententes. Id. at 40, Interview in Paris, Sept. 30, 1964.
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competition.74 It has recognized that increases in demand, or pres-

sure from large buyers may encourage economic progress. 75 Such
investigations, however, are not pushed very far and one often feels,

after reading the conclusions of the reporter or the opinions of the
Commission, that the role of an entente in achieving a particular

result is only evident if one believes that ententes are usually necessary to carry out such programs.
In an attempt to ascertain the role of ententes in the achievement
of particular programs, several officers of companies and trade associations were questioned. While they emphasized the useful role
of ententes in encouraging economic progress, some of their replies
to specific questions were more skeptical. The Commission's statement that a certain technical program was probably made possible
by an entente was questioned by one company official who did not

doubt that his company would have carried out the program anyway.
In another instance, an officer of a trade association said that he
felt that a particular entente was not very beneficial and probably

owed its justification under article 59 ter more to the arguing skills
of the president of the trade associations than to its own merits.
The Commission seems to rely on a belief that ententes are

usually helpful and may even be essential to various technical programs. It will examine the clearer examples of external influences
such as a marked increase in demand 6 and consider facts such as
that the non-members of the entente had carried out equally important
technical programs.7 However, it does not go beyond these limited
steps and seems to base its judgment on a general appreciation of
whether an industry seems sufficiently modern. Its opinions then seem

to list, somewhat indiscriminately, numerous elements of justification
for the entente.7 8

74. E.g., first report 6.
75. E.g., Entente entre fabricants de fils et cables 6lectriques isol6s, second report 25.
76. E.g., id.
77. E.g., Entente entre fabricants de tuyaux en caoutchouc, fifth report 18.
78. For example in the First Copper Products case, the Commission listed all the
results favorable to economic progress which had been found in the course of the
investigation such as the increase in production and exports, the efforts toward
standardization and improvement of quality, the specialization agreements, the measures
toward concentration of production and the creation of common sales agencies. The
Commission then remarked that the quotas had undoubtedly favored the specialization
agreements. Entente entre fabricants de demi-produits en m6tatx cuivreux, fourth report
307. The text of the Commission's opinion, however, gives no indication whether the
other programs could also be attributed to the existence of the quotas. An examination
of the reporters memorandum, which the Commission closely followed in its discussion of
whether the entente could be justified, seems to indicate that the Commission intended
to attribute all these programs to the entente. Trouvet, Rapport sur les ententes exfstant
entre les fabricants dedemi-produits en cuivre et en laiton 8-10 (1957). The reporter
however believed that the increase in production, was largely a result of the demand
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B. Concentrationof Industry
The Commission's opinions reflect an unqualified enthusiasm for
concentration, regardless of whether an expanding or a declining
industry is under consideration. They show no indication of the often
expressed United States preference for small businesses and little fear
of oligopolists setting prices by tacit agreement or dominating consumer choice.
French postwar economic analysis usually starts from the assumption that the units of business are too small; it wants to reverse the
prewar bias in favor of the small firms.79 An industrial study by JeanMarcel Jeanneney, the Minister of Industry from 1959 to 1962, summarizes this attitude.
The small firms, however, too often lagged behind possible technical

progress. The reasons are intellectual and financial. New techniques are
hard to find out about, to choose and to put into operation. The head of a
small firm who has to keep track of everything, often lacks the time and
qualifications necessary, whereas the large business can devote certain
employees to the documentation of new processes, and to research and
development. Since the direction of family firms is hereditary, they risk
falling into incapable hands. When they need to carry out investment, they

cannot tap public savings through bonds or stocks. Their owners, fearing
the loss of full control of their business, often fail to use the financial help
that they could obtain from banks or individuals. 8 0

The solution applied to the problems of small firms has been a
universal encouragement of concentration and interfirm co-operation.
While a policy of economic concentration could be developed alongside a vigorous promotion of competition, 81 these two policies are
often considered to be contradictory. The general attitude in France
favors all interindustry agreements in order to promote more rational
utilization of production facilities and for the role they may play in
82
preparing and encouraging companies to merge.
The enthusiasm for concentration and interindustry co-operation
can be seen in the attitude of the Planning Commission 3 and the
various measures to encourage concentration taken by the government.
of large buyers. Id. at 8. Furthermore, he considered that the nature of the product

limited the feasibility of its exportation. Id. at 2.
79. SHEAHA, op. cit. supranote 63, at 240-41.
80.

JEANNENEY,

FORCES

ET FAIBLESSES DE LECONOMIE FRANCAISE

81. HoussiAux, LE Pouvom DE MONOPOLE 296 (1958).
82. ENTENTEs, FUSIONS, ACTIONS COLLECTIVES (EXPJ.UENCES
INTER-ENTR .RisEs)

83.

SHEAHAN,

77-78, 141 (1962).

Op. cit. supra

258-59 (1956).
DE

COLLABORATION

note 63, at 180. For the transformation industries, see

COMIvssARIAT GQlNRAL DU PL.AN, QUATRME PLAN DE DEVELOPPEMENT
ET SOCIAL

(1962-1965) at 362 (1962).

CONOMIQUE
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The Fifth Plan thus proposes the establishment, or the reinforcement when
they already exist, of a small number of firms or groups of internationalsize
capable of confronting foreign groups in the areas where competition has
become established: technical autonomy, size of production and distribution
units, ability to deal with different groups of customers and compete in
different geographic markets, a reserve of power so as to be able to counter
rapidly the appearance of nev products, etc. In the majority of the important branches of industry (aluminum, steel, machinery, electrical construction, electronics, automobiles, aeronautics, chemistry, pharmaceutics, etc.)
the number of these groups ought to be very limited, often reduced only
one or two.84
The Planning Commission never seems to have asked itself whether

only diseconomies of scale might result from a particular merger or
whether it might be dangerous to allow a firm to reach a dominant
position in the French market. With the assumption that the French
firm is usually too small, the first question probably has rarely been
posed. As to the second, it probably would be answered that the real
problem is to insure that the units of French business are large enough
to confront Common Market competition, and that any dominance in
the French market would be countered by international competition. 85
The Planning Commission relies heavily on trade associations both
for the assembling of information in the development of the plans 8
and in the transmission of its recommendations to the individual
companies.87 In a discussion of the transformation industry, it said:
Given the still very dispersed structure of most branches of this industry,
the small and medium sized firms which form the largest part of the various
branches are not sufficiently well equipped to deal with all the problems that
they meet. They should, therefore, have recourse to collective measures,
with their multiple goals and procedures: concentration or specialization
agreements between companies; creation of common research departments,
workshops, sales networks in France or in foreign countries; laboratories;
intervention of collective financing arrangements (common surety funds,
groups for collective borrowing, joint ventures for the taking of minority
interests or for the financing of decentralization from the Paris region);
technical centers, and centers for increased productivity.
These programs may be brought about either by the companies within
an industrial branch or a region, or, which is more and more frequent, by
the corresponding trade association which not only assists its members as
far as information (statistics, market studies and studies of the general
economic situation), but also makes every effort to put at the disposition of
84. CoMMIssARAT G NJRAL DU PLAN, CINQUIME PLAN DE D VELOPP/ENT ECONOMIQtE ET SOCIAL (1966-1970), at I 68-69 (1965).

85. Interview with Henri Bustarret, Commissariat G6n6ral du Plan, in Paris, July
3, 1964. See Commissariat G6n6ral du Plan, op. cit. supra note 84, at I 68.
86. HACKErr & HACKETT, ECONOMIC PLANNING IN FRANCE 172 (1963).
87. SnEAHAN, op. cit. supra note 63, at 178-79.
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its members a large number of services, which usually only the larger firms
8a
can provide for themselves.

Governmental enthusiasm for concentration and interindustry cooperation is also shown by the laws providing for groupements pro-

fessionnels agr46s and socitds conventionn6es. The creation of the
former was authorized in 195589 to bring companies together for the
purpose of rationalizing production and distribution, and to facilitate
the reconversion of certain firms. These groups where set up especially
to buy and close companies in difficulty which were willing to sell out.
The government has encouraged them by granting tax advantages,
but has also subjected them to certain surveillance. 93 Businessmen
however have shown little enthusiasm and even distrust for this
method of industry reorganization, and few of these groups have been
created. 9' The latter are designed to help small and middle sized companies carry out a whole series of activities in common, such as developing programs of research, reducing their distribution costs, or
increasing their exports.9 2 Here again there is governmental supervision. The group has to submit and have approved a program so as
to be able to enjoy certain tax and93other advantages. These groups
have had considerably more success.
In conclusion, an interview of the Prime Minister, Georges
Pompidou, can be cited:
French industry should increase its efforts to create financial and in-

dustrial units which are larger than the present ones. It is necessary to
proceed toward mergers, toward ententes, toward concentrations so as
to create French firms of an internatonal size, of which there are practically

88.

COMMISSARu

T GN
NT.AL DU PLAN, op. cit. supra note 83, at 381-82. See also

Boudin, "Extrait de la discussion finale" in ENrmzIrEs, FusioNs, AcoNs COLLrTVS
(EXP-RIENCES DE COLLABORATION IlTER-ENTREPIUSES) 164 (1962).
89. Decree No. 55-877, June 30, 1955, [1955]

Oct. 18, 1955, [1955]

J.O. 6640, Decree No. 55-1369,

J.O. 10353, Circular, Jan. 21, 1956, [1956]

J.O. 828.

The decree of Oct. 18, 1956 provides at art. 5 that the "Commission technique
des ententes . . . can ask the appropriate ministers for any information on
the activities of the groupements professionnels agr66s. The Commission may also
suggest to the Minister for Finances and Economic Affairs or to the Minister for

Industry and Commerce revocation of the official approval provided for by paragraph
3 of article 4."

Furthermore, the Circular of Jan. 21, 1956 states that "the groups

must not act in a manner contrary to the regulations concerning ententes or to the
case law of the comit6 [sic] technique des ententes." The Commission briefly discussed these dispositions in its first report, first report 7; but it has made no subsequent

mention of this legislation.
90. VAsszm, Les formes juridiques de la collaboration industrielle, in Dix ANS DE CONFkRENCEs D'ACGCATION, ETuDis DE Dorr coMMEcRIL

OFFFRTES A JOSEPH HAMEL

101, 104-06 (1961).
91. Id. at 106.
92. Ordinance No. 59-248, Feb. 4, 1959, [1959] J.O. 1754.
93. Vasseur notes that at the end of 1960 there were 34 soci~t~s conventionn~es and
14 applications were in the course of being studied. VAssEur, op. cit. supra note 90,
at 116.
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none at the moment. It is a fact that now the largest French companies
are small, not only in comparison to American companies, but also in

comparison to large Europeon firms.9

Several commentators have questioned the validity of the assumption that concentration has always been useful in French industry
and will continue to be so. Kindleberger doubts that the general
increase in the size of the family firms has been a major cause of the
economic revival, and attributes it more to a change in attitude of
the companies themselvesf 5 Sheahan questions that large firms have
all the advantages that are often attributed to them, noting that if
they did and there were no discriminations against them "one would
expect that a long-run test would reveal a pronounced increase in their
relative role, measurable as an increase in concentration."9 He notes,
however, that this was not the case in the United States during the
first half of the twentieth century where the relative positions of the
largest companies did not significantly change. 97 Sheahan agrees
that the inefficient fringe of small producers has been a major problem
of French industry,
but the real possibility of gain from greater market pressure to
eliminate those firms which are inefficient may easily become confused

with the less helpful idea that greater size automatically means superior

98
efficiency and should therefore be promoted actively by any and all means.

Houssiaux, though recognizing a need for increased concentration in
France, wants it to be accompanied by a control of oligopolies so as
to lead toward economic expansion and increased competition. 99 He
also questions the French enthusiasm for mergers and notes that,
with the number of unsuccessful mergers, this method of reorganization ought to remain exceptional.10°
The Commission techniques des entes has shown itself hospitable
toward all measures of concentration, condemning rigid quotas and
price agreements when they tend to preserve small inefficient units.
In its fourth report, it stated that increased concentration would have
been a factor in lowering the cost of production in two cases which
it had examined.
In passing one could call attention to the contrast between this assumption
94. Pompidou, Interview, Entreprise, June 20, 1964, p. 43-45.
95. KiNDLER.cm,, The Postwar Resurgence of the French Economy, in IN SEARc I OF
FRANc. 130 (1963).
op. cit. supranote 63, at 245.
96. SHE.H,
97. Id. at 245-46.
98. Id. at 245.
99. HoussxAux, op. cit. supra note 81, at 296.
100. Id. at 324.
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favoring concentration-based after all on French economic realities-and
the contrary assumption which forms the base of certain foreign legislation.
One could think that this assumption ought to be revised when the commission examines ententes covering a larger geographic area, that of the
Common Market, or when an excessive concentration ceases to correspond
to an economic optimum and becomes a way to attain a dominant position
and possibly to abuse it.101

With this expressed attitude, it seems likely that the Commission
will not examine the merits of particular concentration agreements
but rather regard them all as contributing to economic progress. It
has given no indication of what it considers to be an economic
optimum or when it will undertake such an investigation. Moreover,
the cases in which it has examined the question of dominant position
show that it is worried little by the existence of monopolies in the
French market.0 ° The wholehearted approval of concentration by
the Commission is accompanied by a rather limited belief in competition. Although the French antitrust laws were apparently set up
to promote competition, the Commission has not moved far from
traditional French attitudes. There is a tendency in France, on the
one hand, to cite the thirties as an example of a period that relied
upon competition; 10 3 and, on the other, to point out that since the
war an apparatus of planning, price control, selective promotion and
protection has been substituted for the inactive prewar market. 104
It should be remembered, however, that the revival of competition in
some industries and the excellent demand conditions have also encouraged the French economic expansion.0 5
American ideas of free competition are often considered only as
a sporting rivalry and as more of a mystique than a technique.'06
According to such reasoning, a vigorous French antitrust policy would
be disapproved as hindering interindustry co-operation, regarded as
helpful to economic progress and essential if French businesses are
to be competitive in the Common Market.
The Planning Commission rarely mentions the possibilities of competition as it apparently prefers a more consciously planned procedure
of market organization. 107 As with its encouragement of concentration,
101. Fourth report 305. The two cases referred to were the Entente entre fabricants
de coeurs d'aiguillages en acier moul6 an mangan&se, fourth report 311, and the
Entente dans l'industrie de la meunerie parisienne, fourth report 316.
102. See text accompanying notes 134-50 infra.
103. SHAsHAN, op. cit. supra note 63, at 250.
104. Id. at 251.

105. Ibid.
106. MRcHmi
(1960).

PwfFACE TO HoussLAx,

CONCURRENCE ET MARCHi

COMMUN vii

107. Interview supra note 85, and see also the Planning Commission's discussion of
the need for co-ordination of investments in the Common Market in which it notes
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the Planning Commission seems to believe that the risk of the
existence of restrictive practices can be discounted in the face of the
competition from the rest of the Common Market. These observations
can also be supported by the exception the Planning Commission
made in the Fourth Plan for the sector of commerce where it declared
that competition was to be an essential part of the reform of the
distribution circuits.'08 Here there is neither the danger nor the challenge of Common Market competition.
The Planning Commission seems to attach little importance to the
domestic antitrust legislation. 10 9 The only recent mention of the laws
seems to be in the cited example, and even there attention is directed
toward vertical agreements: refusal to deal, resale price maintenance,
and discriminatory practices. There is no mention of the dangers of
horizontal agreements. One of the committees which participated in
the elaboration of the Third Plan said that the realization of mergers
and specialization agreements was hindered by the existence of the
French antitrust legislation. 110 However, when the committee returned
to this question in its report before the Fourth Plan, it was able to
note that the domestic legislation "did not provide a real obstacle to
the realization of agreements which were desirable on the national
level. " " It was now concerned that the Common Market antitrust
provisions would hinder structural reforms in French industries.
Besides suggesting that the domestic legislation may only have a
modest effect on the national economy, this statement shows a clear
preference for market reorganization on a noncompetitive basis.
The Commission technique des ententes favors concentration both
in industries which are expanding or which are already highly concentrated and in those which are becoming obsolescent or in which
2
demand has permanently diminished. In the Electric Light Mfrs."

that it would be illogical to allow a disorderly competition which would be susceptible
of causing serious losses to certain companies and which would lead to overproduction
in certain sectors contrary to public policy. Commissariat G6n6ral du Plan, op. cit.
supra note 83, at 102.
108. Commissariat G6n6ral du Plan, op. cit. supra note 83, at 400-09. The extremely
dispersed nature of this sector could also be cited as a reason for not trying to rely
on the usual planning techniques. There is no indication, however, that the Planning
Commission has ever decided to change its usual planning techniques because the low
level of concentration may hinder their effectiveness, and the plan for commerce does
not differ materially from those for other sectors.

Sectors of the transformation

industries, such as laundries and dry cleaning, also have low levels of concentration.
For the Fifth Plan, see Commissariat G6n6ral du Plan, op. cit. supra note 84, at I
86-88, II 248.
109. See Interview supra note 85, SHnA_.Am, op. cit. supra, note 63, at 178-79.
110. Commissariat G6n6ral du Plan, Troisidme plan de modernisation et d'dquipement, Rapport g~ndral de la commission des industries de transformation127-28 (1958).
111. Commissariat G6n6ral du Plan, Quatriame plan de ddveloppement 6conomique
et social, Rapport gdndral de la commission des industries de transformation 118 (1961).
112. Entente entre fabricants de lampes 6lectriques, second report 22.
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case the market was largely divided between Philips-Compagnie des
lampes, representing fifty-five per cent of the production, and Claude
Paz et Visseaux, a company which had been formed by a governmentally encouraged merger of seven small producers, 113 which accounted for thirty percent. After examining the quotas and other
restrictive practices, the Commission declared that to the extent that
the entente had created conditions favorable to the merger from
which a lowering of the production costs could be expected, it
could be regarded as having favored economic progress in the sense
of article 59 ter. While the economic situation may have made it
impossible for the seven small producers to compete with Philips,
the question was not considered.
Later, in the First Copper Products case, 4a the Commission approved the acquisitions carried out by two of the three largest companies in the industry, and stated that this concentration and various
specialization agreements between the three largest companies had
favored the creation of large and modem production facilities.
In an industry which is becoming obsolescent or in which there
has been a substantial decrease in demand, the Commission prefers
a planned elimination of the inefficient firms rather than leaving the
matter to competition. In discussing the various measures which could
be taken in the hypothesis of a sharp reduction in demand, the Commission noted that it had been twice called upon to examine industries
in which there had been such a decline, and said:
Elimination of a certain number of enterprises by free competition supposes a temporary collapse of prices, susceptible to be followed by a
reaction in the opposite direction if the surviving firms either are not those
with the lowest cost or are in a monopolistic or ologopolistic position and
can freely fix their prices ....
In other words, the Commission has not automatically preferred a system
of selection based on bitter competition and price wars; this position is
normal for a body charged with applying a law which differs markedly
on this point from the principles of American antitrust law.... 115

Little comment need be added to this quotation, except to note
that in neither of the two industrial sectors to which the Commission
113. Houssiaux states that the r~le of the Commission technique des ententes was the
determining factor in bringing about this merger but cites no authority. Houssiaux, op.
cit. supra note 81, at 389. The Commission only says in its opinion that the decision was
reached after governmental intervention. Furthermore neither the administrative report
nor the reporter's memorandum prepared before the Commission's second examination of
the entente in 1964 gives any indication that the Commission had played an active
role in encouraging the merger of the seven small companies.
114. Entente entre fabricants de demi-products de m6taux cuivreux, fourth report
307. For the factual situation see Trouvet, op. cit. supra note 78, at 8-9.
115. Fourth report 305.
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referred was there a company near a dominant position. Moreover,
in one there was the further restraint that the industry was dependent
upon a single powerful client, the French railway;" 6 and in the
n7
other there was already extensive governmental regulation.
A second possibility considered by the Commission is the maintenance of all the companies with a reduction in the production of
each proportionate to the overall decline in demand." 8 In the
Milling" 9 case the Commission objected to such a system, using
quotas and penalties, because it had hindered an evolution in the
industry which could have permitted a reduction of costs by a concentration of production in a smaller number of mills. The Minister,
in his decision, noted that the members of the entente, which included
a majority of the millers in the Paris region, were operating at less
than forty-five per cent of capacity, while the nonmembers' production exceeded seventy per cent of their capacity.uo While the disapproval of this quota agreement is consistent with theories which
favor competition, it proceeds here from a belief in concentration.
Occasionally, the Commission has shown sympathy for the argument that a limitation and division of production can manage to
stabilize temporarily an industry in the event of a sharp decline in
demand.1'1 In the Conveyor Belt'm case, however, the Commission
said that the entente had failed to show that fixing quotas and recommending prices had been necessary; and that with the changes in
the economic situation, the quotas should be made variable to allow
changes in market shares.
The method of meeting the problem of excess supply preferred
by the Commission is the "elimination of a certain number of enterprises by a somewhat authoritative selection based on criteria of
productivity."m In the Railway Repair Shop'2 case, it examined
an industry in which the orders from the French railway, practically
the only client, had dropped by almost two-thirds during the preceding six years. After the war the French railway's supply of rolling stock
was depleted and in bad condition, and necessarily it called on all its
former repair shops and numerous other plants. With the reparation
116. Entente dans rindustrie de r6paration du mat6riel roulant ferroviaire, fourth
report 315.
117. Entente dans rindustrie de la meunerie parisienne, fourth report 316.
118. Fourth report 305.
119. Entente dans rindustrie de la meunerie parisienne, fourth report 316.
120. Id. at 317 (ministerial decision).
121. Entente dans rindustrie du savon de m6nage, first report 8.
122. Entente entre.fabricants de bandes transporteuses en caoutchouc, fourth report
312.
123. Fourth report 305.
124. Entente dans rindustrie de r6paration du mat6rial roulant ferroviaire, fourth
report 315.
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of the wartime deterioration, the utilization of larger cars, a more
efficient use of rolling stock, and a drop in total railroad traffic, the
number of shops declined from a high of 110 to 86 in 1948 and to
33 in 1951. The total hours worked dropped from 39.5 million in
1948 to 14.3 in 1954. In May 1954, the French railway notified the
industry's trade association that the volume of work would drop to
9.4 million hours for the following year. m The President of the trade
association then saw the situation as a choice between the elimination of certain firms by an extremely bitter competition and the closing
of certain companies against the payment of an indemnity furnished
by those companies which continued. The members of the trade
association adopted the latter solution, and an impartial expert, M.
Surleau, was chosen to decide which enterprises should be closed
down. After a consultation with the various governmental bodies
concerned, but apparently without attempting to either visit or contact
the individual companies, 126 M. Surleau recommended that eleven
of the remaining thirty-three shops should be closed and expressed
his hope that these eleven would receive priority to governmental aid
27
for reconversion and payments from the shops which continued.
Although noting that he was not obliged to explain the reasons for
his choice, M. Surleau briefly listed the criteria he had used. He
explained first that he attached less importance to a geographical
convenience for the French railways than to the preservation of shops
in the less industrialized regions of France, in which the re-employment of about 4,000 workers would also be more difficult. He also
considered the productivity of certain particularly well equipped and
organized companies; the ease of reconversion, which might encourage the preservation of the more specialized enterprises; and the
prices charged by each. Finally he said that, all things being equal,
the more recent entrants should be eliminated first.m The President
of the trade association refused to accept the protests of one company
that M. Surleau's conclusion be re-examined. The decision was then
enforced by the French railway which wrote each of the eleven that
its market would not be continued after July 1, 1955.129 The Commis125. The figures were cited in a letter from an expert named by the trade association
to its president. Letter from Surleau to the Pr6sident of the Syndicat des r6parateurs
de mat6riel roulant de cherin de fer, Dec. 13, 1954. [hereinafter cited as Surleau
report.]
126. See Surleau report 4. Me Lussan, an attorney for one of the companies eliminated in a later civil suit for damages, explained that M. Surleau had in no
way entered into contact with his client before reaching his decision as to which
companies should be shut down. Me Lussan added that he did not see how the
Surleau report could be considered as a serious study. Interview in Paris, Sept. 11, 1964.
127. Surleau report 5.
128. Id. at 3-4.
129. Letter from the Direction du mat6riel et de la traction, Soci6t6 nationale des
chemins de fer francais, Dec. 24, 1954.
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sion technique des ententes unhesitatingly accepted these measures.
Considering that it results from the investigation that the measures taken

have resulted in a concentration of firms which is likely to assure more efficient
operations; that these measures are based on considerations some of which
are social, but others of which tend toward a better geographical and
technical allocation of orders, and, in a word, to an organization more in
conformity with economic progress. 130

The Commission thus approved the action of a private trade association which, after a fairly superficial investigation, eliminated the

business of one third of its members. Such solutions seem so capable
of abuse that they should either be governmentally directed or at
least reviewed by the Commission or the courts. The government's
role here seems to have been limited to M. Surleau's consultation with
certain governmental bodies and acceptance of his recommendations
by the French railway. The Commission refused to examine the
basis for the elimination of particular companies and said, in relation
to the Mariage Company, which had provoked the investigation by
a complaint to the Minister,
Considering that without doubt the expert limited himself to indicate the
general criteria which he relied upon, without stating the reason for each
recommendation; and that if the Commission technique des ententes is
consequently not in a position to verify the merits of the decision taken
with regard to the Mariage Company in the light of the expert's criteria, it is
not appropriate for the commission to make a recommendation on this
point.131

The civil courts, however, were not willing to allow such a drastic
industry reorganization. The Mariage Company in two suits recovered
largely nominal damages and more importantly, finally managed to
secure new orders in 1 9 6 1 .13 In the first case the Cour d'Appel of

Paris held that the trade association had exceeded its powers when

it provoked the elimination of Mariage, thus committing a wrong

which should be indemnified. The court added that the prohibitions
of article 59 supported its conclusions.
As the consideration of the Commission's attitude toward concen130. Entente dans l'industrie de r6paration du mat6riel roulant ferroviaire, fourth
report 315.
131. Ibid.
132. Etablissements Mariage v. Syndicat des r6parateurs de mat6riel roulant de
chemin de fer, Tribunal Civil de la Seine, Jan. 16, 1957 (unreported), reed, Cour
d'Appel de Paris, Nov. 4, 1959, [1960] J.C.P. 11.11488 (note R. Plaisant), [1960]
Gazette du Palais [hereinafter cited as Gaz. Pal.] 1.168, [1961] Annales de la
propri6t6 industrielle 163. Etablissements Mariage v. Syndicat des reparateurs de
mat6riel roulant de cherein de fer, Tribunal de Grand Instance de la Seine, Feb. 20,
1962 (unreported), aff'd, Cour d'Appel de Paris, June 11, 1963 (unreported).
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tration would suggest, it is little worried by monopolies or dominant
positions. The first four reports rarely seem to have examined these
problems. 133 While the Commission considered, among the cases included in the latest report, several situations in which companies had
dominant positions, it does not seem to have changed its attitude
toward concentration. Moreover, the Commission has not interpreted
the new French law directed against the abuse of a dominant position
as requiring any change in its policies. 1'
In the first of these cases contained in the fifth report, the Commission examined an entente between the two dominant producers of
steel pipes and a second agreement which linked these two producers
with the majority of the other manufacturers. 13 In a wholly typical
opinion, it disapproved of quotas and other agreements and recommended that various technical programs be increased. None of the
recommendations made would however in any way have tended to
separate the two largest manufacturers. It limited itself to saying,
in an indirect reference to the existence of their dominant positions,
that if price control was abolished and if a sharp increase in profit
margins followed, or if the functioning of the entente revealed that
it was impossible for new companies to enter the market, the case
should be immediately brought again before the Commission.
The Road Material3 6 case initially would seem to show a change
in the Commission's position. In the fifth report, this case was cited
for the proposition that the commission considered that it was "obviously desirable 'to prevent a group from obtaining a dominant
position."" 3 7 However, when the statement is put into context, it
seems to proceed more from a partly nationalistic fear of foreign
competition than any distrust of concentration. The entente had been
formed between several French quarry-owners and a Belgian group,
which apparently was more developed technically and had a larger
production and greater financial resources. The agreement had been
established with the approval of the French governmental agencies
concerned in order to meet the problems created by new road
building techniques and to attenuate for the French companies the
133. In one case the Commission said that in the light of the characteristics of a
particular market the end of the quota agreement would probably have no effect other
than to favor the formation of a biopoly. This statement, however, is contradicted by
another in the case in which the Commission objected that the quotas had hindered
concentration. Entente entre fabricants de bandes transporteuses en caoutchouc,
fourth report 312.
134. See fifth report 11.
135. Entente dans l'industrie des tubes d'acier, fifth report 16.
136. Entente franco-belge sur le march6 des mat6riaux de viabilit6, fifth report 22.
137. See fifth report 11.
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consequences of the freer trade to be allowed under the Treaty of
38
Rome.
The Commission in analyzing the situation, stressed the strength of
the Belgian group:
Considering that the Belgian group, by the magnitude of its production
and by the importance of its financial backing, would have, in a situation of
free competition, a position much stronger than that of the French quarries;
that in such a situation it would be logical to expect a realignment of

market shares following not only the geographical placement of the mineral
deposits, but also following direct interventions of the Belgian group in

French firms in the form of mergers and other contracts; that this would
be likely in the long run to reduce the degree of competition which now
remains in the market; that the reduction in the number of sellers risks to
operate to the detriment of the users and that, in these conditions, it is
appropriate to prevent a group from obtaining a dominant position. 139

After its examination of the good and bad elements of the entente, the
Commission concluded that the agreement could not be justified
in its present form. However, it felt that, in the light of the power
of the Belgian group and certain discriminatory provisions of the
Belgian laws and transportation regulations, any measures taken
against the entente would not end the exclusion of French products
from Belgian markets but only open up French markets to the foreign
products. Thus, it made no recommendation except that the entente
not be extended.
The more obvious argument of the Commission is that it should
not recommend the elimination of those illegal measures which
favor French industry if it cannot reach those which hinder French
businesses in foreign countries. 140 The Commission, however, went
further as it did not want the group, which already had a quasimonopoly in Belgium, to extend its power in France. This argument
would present few problems if the Commission usually objected to
concentration and dominant positions, but this has rarely been the
case. Moreover, the Commission seems to have been eager to see a
concentration of the French companies.
Six months later in the Cast-Iron Pipe'41 case, the Commission apparently extended the scope of its jurisdiction as it examined the effect
of a merger of two firms to form a company which accounted for
ninety-five per cent of the French market. The facts of the case,
138. Entente franco-belge sur le march6 des mat&iaux de viabilit6, fifth report 22.
139. Ibid.
140. The Commission gives article 59 a fairly strict territorial interpretation. See
e.g., Id., fifth report 11, but see Entente entre fabricants de futs m6talliques, second
report 22.
141. Entente dans rindustrie des tuyaux en fonte, fifth report 29.
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however, seem to show the Commission is willing to accept all
measures of concentration. Recognizing that all possibility of competition in the industry was eliminated, it said:
Considering that if article 59 bis has not expressly referred to the abuse
of a dominant position, article 37 of the same ordinance has expressly
dealt with and prohibited the majority of abuses which can facilitate the
existence of such a position; that, in the case at hand and especially
because of the inevitable link which exists between the action of the
entente and that of the firm in a dominant position, it is incumbent upon
the Commission to examine whether the various practices in the industry

lead to a situation which departs abusively from that which would be the
142
result of a competitive market.

The Commission concluded, however, that, in light of the fact, that
there was competition from other types of gas and water pipes, the
arrangement could be justified because of the technical programs
undertaken. Although not so specified, it would appear that most
of these technical programs were carried out before the merger. 43
It is difficult to decide what alternatives the Commission really
considered. Theoretically it could have recommended that the merger
be undone, but it is unlikely that such a solution was seriously
considered. First, the Commission has apparently not abandoned its
enthusiasm for concentration. Second, the reporter had been carrying
on an investigation of certain restrictive practices in the industry
for about a year at the date of the merger. 144 This fact would suggest
that either the companies did not feel that there was a substantial
risk in not awaiting the Commission's opinion before merging, or they
were confident from talks with the reporter that the Commission
would not raise objections. Probably the Commission would not have
felt able to go much further than to make the recommendations it did:
that price control be maintained; that an investigation be made to
establish a new schedule of maximum prices; and that continuation
of competition between cast-iron and other types of gas and water
pipes be assured.145
142. Ibid.
143. The Commission found that the investments carried out by Pont- -Mousson (the
surviving' company in the merger) had permitted an important increase in production
at satisfactory cost and sales prices, that exports had continued at a favorable level,
and that important research and development facilities had permitted France to occupy
a pre-eminent position as to quality. It would seem most unlikely that all these
programs had been carried out by Pont--Mousson between the date of the merger,
Nov. 8, 1960, and the date of the meeting of the Commission, May 19, 1961. Furthermore, as far as rationalization and specialization, the Commission said only that new
measures appeared possible following the merger. Ibid.
144. The case was given to the reporter on Dec. 8, 1959. Fourth report 304.
145. Entente dans l'industrie des tuyaux en fonte, fifth report 29.
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In conclusion it would seem that, in spite of the Road Material 4
case, these three cases do not show a change in the Commission's
attitude toward concentration, but at most, a greater willingness to
examine mergers and dominant positions. Also, in two other cases
covered by the fifth report, the Commission cited the closing of
certain enterprises and the concentration of production as elements
47
of justification1
It was in this context then, that the Commission commented upon
the new law' 48 on abuse of dominant positions.
This lack [of a text specifically devoted to the abuse of dominant positions]
was in truth without great practical inconvenience, because on the one

band such abuses could be effectively forestalled by the application of the
price control regulation . . . when adequate competition could not be
maintained or re-established, and furthermore article 37 defines and permits
the direct suppression of certain abuses which are precisely those which an
149
enterprise occupying a dominant position may employ.

The Commission then examined the investigations which it had
already made of cases involving dominant positions. It concluded
that since it might not always be possible to examine dominant
positions under the prohibitions against ententes "it was pleased that
the legislature had expressly extended its jurisdiction . ...
150
An examination of the legislative history confirms the Commission's
interpretation. The government seems to have had two reasons for
proposing the law. First, the provisions relating to dominant positions
were considered as forming a part of a series of dispositions designed
to limit the abuses of competition and to safeguard honest firms.
Thus, it was proposed to regulate sales at a loss, to modify the procedure for the repression of unfair competition and also to complete
the legislation relative to the abuse of dominant positions. 151 Second,
146. Entente franco-belge sur le march6 des mat6riaux de viabilit6, fifth report 22.
147. Entente entre fabricants de faulx et faucilles, fifth report 26; Entente dans
l'industrie du sel, fifth report 39.
148. Law No. 63-628, July 2, 1963, [1963] J.O. 5915, art. 3. This law added a
paragraph to article 59 bis which states, "Prohibited in a like manner are the activities
of an enterprise or of a group of enterprises occupying a dominant position in the
domestic market characterized by a monopoly situation or by a manifest concentration
of economic power, when these activities have for object or may have as their effect
the restriction of the normal functioning of the market." Article 59 ter was also
amended to provide that dominant positions could be justified in the same conditions as
other restrictive practices.
149. Fifth report 11.
150. Ibid.
151. Assembl6e nationale, Project de loi No. 240, 2e Session ordinaire 1962-1963,
expos6 g6n6ral des motifs 11.
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it was desired to put the French laws in harmony with article 86
52
of the Treaty of Rome.
The legislative debates and the committee reports show little
concern with the risks of abuses committed by firms in dominant
positions although some speakers considered that it would be useful
to have a law with respect to dominant positions. 15 3 One senator,
however, stressed the need for such a law and pointed to a series
of practices carried out by large mills in the Paris and Bordeaux
regions which could quickly lead to the elimination of small local
mills. 5 4 His concern, however, did not find an echo.
A proposed amendment would have changed 'have for object or
could have for effect to restrain the normal functioning of the market"
to eliminate the words "could have." The sponsor of the amendment
said that
given the French industrial structure, especially in comparison to the
concentration existing in certain other Common Market countries, it does
not seem timely to sanction a priori those positions which are only dominant
on a local level at a time when it has not been established that they have
as effect the restraint of the normal functioning of the market. 155

The Minister for Finances and Economic Affairs, however, did not
share this concern and remarked "the criteria is not the dominant
position, it is the fact either to intend or to have for effect a restraint
on the normal functioning of the market and it is that which the Commission technique des ententes will determine." 5 6 The amendment
157
was not adopted.
Several speakers approved the fact that the French laws would be
put in harmony with the Treaty of Rome.' s8 The Commission technique des entes thus seems to have accurately characterized the law
152. Id., expos6 des motifs par article, 19.
153. E.g., Jager. Avis present6 au nom de la Commission des affaires 6conomiques et
du plan, S6nat, No. 107, 2e Session ordinaire 1962-1963 at 11-12. He noted also that
most of the abusive practices were already covered under French law. See also Jager's
speech before the S6nat. [1963] J.O., D6bats Parlementaires [hereinafter cited as D6b.
Parl.], S6nat 1367.
154. Monteil, [1963] J.0., D6b. Parl., S6nat 1227.
155. Pez6, reporter for the amendment of the Commission de la production des
6changes, [1963] J.O., Dab. Parl., Assembl6e nationale [hereinafter cited as Ass. N.]
3123.
156. Giscard d'Estaing, [1963] J.0., Db. Parl., Ass. N. 3123.
157. [1963], J.0., D6b. Parl., Ass. N. 3123. An amendment was also presented to
the S6nat which would have required that an effective restraint on the normal
functioning of the market be shown. Jager, Avis present6 au nom de la Commission
des affaires 6nconomiques et du plan, op. cit. supra, note 153, at 13-14. See also his
speech [1963] J.0., D6b. Parl., S6nat 1367. This amendment was not adopted by the
S6nat which three times rejected the law for grounds which are unrelated to the
questions considered in this article.
158. E.g., Vallon, reporter for the bill, [1963] J.0., D6b. Parl., Ass. N. 3123.
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as a slight extension of its jurisdiction. It was certainly not the
intention of the-legislature to enact a law changing the national policy
towards concentration and dominant positions.
IV. PI~cncEs DisAPPRovED BY

E COMMISSION

The practices which will now be examined include market sharing,
agreements designed to equalize profits between groups of companies,
price fixing and discriminatory pricing. For purposes of analysis of
the work of the Commission, the significance of these practices is
the obvious fact that they do not have as a direct result a technical
or organizational program. It is in the light of this fact that the
Commission judges them and decides whether or not they favor
economic progress. It objects to practices which hinder technical
advances or concentration but not those which may limit competition
without any other immediately demonstrable, harmful effect. Thus,
one quota agreement may be condemned for helping to preserve
marginal enterprises in an industry 59 and another accepted as assisting specialization programs. 160
While it could be said that almost all of the practices which will
be considered in this section restrain competition, such a statement
does not advance an analysis very far since most of the justifications
accepted by the Commission are also anticompetitive.
A. Sharing of Markets and Risks
In this section agreements which guarantee firms a certain fraction
of the market or which allocate the risks of profit and loss over
several enterprises will be considered. The former may divide sales
by means of quotas' 61 or through collusive bidding on government

contracts. 162 The latter include indemnities paid to firms which fall
short of their production quotas 163 and arrangements designed to
equalize the raw material costs of all the members of an entente. 164
1. Market Sharing.-The use of quotas is a restrictive practice which

the Commission has often examined and one toward which it adopts
an ambivalent attitude. On the one hand, it believes that quotas
159. E.g.,
report 9.
160. E.g.,
report 307.
161. E.g.,
162. E.g.,
163. E.g.,
report 9.
164. E.g.,

Entente dans rindustrie et le commerce de la levure de panification, first
Entente entre fabricants de demi produits en m6taux cuivreutx, fourth
Ibid.
Entente dans l'industrie de l'acier moul6, fifth report 37.
Entente dans l'industrie et le commerce de la levure de panification, first
Entente dans l'industrie du superphosphate, fifth report 18.
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may be the only way to provide a sufficiently stable market for firms
to take the risks of implementing various technical or organizational
programs; but on the other, if the quotas are too rigid, they may either
hinder such desirable programs or limit their benefits to the economy.
To resolve this difficulty the Commission has distinguished between:
"Malthusian" quotas which apply to a whole branch of an industry with a
rigidity enforced by the operation of a system of penalties and indemnities

tending solely to crystalize the conditions of production and sale; and the
quotas which provide a support for and a way of implementing specializa165
tion agreements.

The Commission dislikes rigid quotas because they prevent increases in the market shares of the most efficient firms and consequently tend to keep prices artificially high,166 and because they may
discourage concentration. 167 Here competition seems to be regarded
as useful for the elimination of the most inefficient producers.'6 However, for the achievement of the positive results of a technical or
organizational program, it feels quotas may often be necessary. In the
First Copper Products69 case it explained:
Considering that the existence of quotas has lessened the manufacturers'

fears of the economic risks of specialization and the dependence on others
for their supplies; that it has permitted them to plan their investments . . .
that thus the quotas have undoubtedly favored a rearranging of the structure
of the industry, which seems very important in relation to the size and the
characteristics of the market and which could thus be considered as favorable

to economic progress.

The Commission thus reverses the United States assumption that
competition will force companies to modernize. Furthermore, it said
in its second report that it was an open question whether the utilization of a quota arrangement was the inevitable basis of the achieved
specialization agreements. 7 0
The Minister, however, has questioned the need to guarantee for
a long period the market share of a firm which has concluded a
specialization agreement and is in the process of adapting its investments to its new lines of production. He noted that this practice was
165. Second report 18.
166. E.g., Entente dans l'industrie et le commerce de la levure panification, first
report 9.

167. Fourth report 305.
168. In the case of a crisis in an industry, however, the Commission prefers a more
carefully planned solution. E.g., Entente dans l'industrie de r6paration du mat6iel

roulant ferroviaire, fourth report 315.
169. Entente entre fabricants de demi-produits en m6taux cuivreux, fourth report
307.
170. Second report 18.
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not allowed in Great Britain or in the United States, and concluded
that any quotas should only be for a short period, should be variable,
and should not be accompanied by unreasonable penalties.'
In its fifth report, the Commission indicated that it would look
more closely before allowing quotas. 172 Although it still believed
they might be necessary to assure particular technical programs, it
cited a case in which it had decided that:
Neither
invoked
quotas.
are not
tion. 173

the amount of capital needed nor the technical necessities can be
in the drawn steel industry to justify the existence of production
Thus the fluctuations in sales which may be caused by competition
of such a nature as to hinder plans for investment and moderniza-

Furthermore, in several other cases included in the fifth report, the
Commission said that the necessity of quota agreements to carry out
various programs had not been shown and it recommended that
these quota agreements be abolished.
The restrictive effect of quotas may either be aggravated by levying
penalties against firms which exceed their quotas, or attenuated by
permitting gradual changes in market shares. Although the Commission has occasionally allowed quotas to be enforced by penalties,
these have usually been regarded as undesirable because they make
quotas more rigid or increase the price of the goods sold by the firms
which have exceeded their quotas. 74 When such quotas have been
permitted, the Minister has insisted that they be limited to a reasonable amount such as the gross profit on the items for which quotas
were fixed. 75
As with several other restrictive practices, the Commission adopted
171. Entente entre fabricants de demi-produits en m6tax cuivreux, fourth report 308
(ministerial decision). See also Entente entre fabricants de fils et cables 6lectriques
isol6s, second report 27 (ministerial decision). In each case the Commission had
decided that the quotas had helped make possible the implementation of programs
favorable to economic progress.
172. Fifth report 13.
173. Entente dans rindustrie des aciers 6tir6s, fifth report 36.
174. An agreement which provided for penalties to be paid to a group which
would use the sums for purposes benefitting the industry in general was allowed
by the commission in the First Copper Products case. Entente entre fabricants de
demi-produits en mtaux cuivreux, fourth report 307. The Commission also cited as an
attenuating factor the fact that the penalties were small and thus had had little direct
effect on prices. Ibid. This fact, however, could also be regarded as a demonstration
of an ententes effectiveness. The Commission seemed to be aware of this enforcement
function of penalties and said immediately after the statement quoted above that the
penalties had not hindered certain firms from increasing their shares of the market
or the disappearance of certain others. Ibid. See also Trouvet, Rapport sur les
ententes existant entre les fabricants de demi-produits en cuivre et en laiton 5 (1957).
175. Entente entre fabricants de demi-produits en m6taux cuivreux, fourth report
308 (ministerial decision).
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a more severe attitude toward penalties in its latest report, and it
said that penalties (for firms which exceeded their quotas) and
indemnities (for those which fell short) were in themselves contrary
16
to article 59 bis even if their application was purely problematical. 7
Furthermore, in the three-year period covered by the report no penalty
clauses were allowed. In the Second Copper Products'7 case, however, the Commission allowed an agreement which provided for
penalties, saying that the sums paid by the companies which had
exceeded their quotas were not intended to subsidize firms which
had not attained their quotas since such sums were to be paid to
a group for purposes which would benefit the whole industry. It
found, nevertheless, that the existing arrangement could significantly
increase the price in the event of a recession and asked that it be
revised so that the penalties would be less steeply progressive.
To assure compliance with quota agreements, penalties are often
progressive. For example, a clause in an agreement among the
manufacturers of copper products provided that the penalty would
be five times as great for an excess of more than thirty per cent over
the quota than one of less than fifteen per cent. In this case there
was also a provision that the sanctions were to become smaller as
the total industry production increased, but to become more important
if there was a recession. 178
The effect of quotas may be varied if firms with unfilled quotas
either sell or give them to companies desiring to increase their production. The Commission condemns the former practice as giving
a profit to firms which have performed no service and thus uselessly
increasing costs. 179 The free cession of quotas is approved, however,
because it gives added flexibility to quota arrangements. 18 Only a
minor objection can be raised against such cessions, that is, the quotas
of the firms involved will not be changed by agreements which allow
variations in quotas so as to take account of changes in the volume
of a firm's production since theoretically the quotas will have been
observed.' 8
The Commission insists that all quota agreements be variable to
176. Fifth report 13.
177. Ententes entre fabricants de demi-produits en m6taux euivreux, Mar. 22, 1963.
This opinion will eventually be published in a sixth report of the Commission. The
case, in which the Commission found that the entente was justified under article 59
ter, is especially interesting since it represents a retreat from several positions taken by
the Commission in its fifth report.
178. Direction g6n6rale des prix et des enqu~tes 6conomiques, Note sur les ententes
existant entre les fabricants de demi-produits en cuivre et en laiton 2 (1957).
179. Entente pour l'organisation du march6 de la langouste, fourth report 318.
180. Entente fabricants de demi-products en m6taux cuivreux, fourth report 307.
181. The Commission recognized this effect in the Second Copper Products case.
Ententes entre fabricants de demi-produits en m6taux cuivreux, Mar. 22, 1963.
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allow at least a gradual evolution in market shares. In the Plate
Glass'u case it approved a stipulation providing for a redetermination of a company's quota if it varied from its quota in two consecutive
years. In another case the Minister specified that the quotas should
be revised annually to take account of a firm's efforts to augment its
capacity and to specialize and that all exports should be placed outside
the quotas.'83 These systems of variation only attenuate the effect of
quota agreements since a large change in a particular firm's production may result in a fairly small change in the corresponding quota;
and the initial excess of the quota may have been penalized. In the
Second Copper Products'8 case the reporter examined a complex
variation formula, which he characterized as responding to a preoccupation of avoiding brutal fluctuations in quotas.' The amount
by which a year's sales exceeded or fell short of the quota was first
averaged with the figures for the two preceding years. The average
was then multiplied by a fraction which varied according to the
production of the industrial sector and the amount of the excess
over the quota. Finally it was only the variable part of the quota,
fifty per cent in the particular case, which was altered. From an
example discussed by the reporter, it seems that in two instances
the increase in the quotas represented about twenty per cent of the
amount by which the quota had been exceeded.'8
The actual effect of quotas is hard to estimate. Even if the Commission gave precise details of changes in market shares, that would
not indicate whether these would have been larger without quotas.
When one gets beyond the most rigid type of arrangements, it is a
question of choosing an economic hypothesis; that firms need market
stability to modernize or that any such agreements hinder economic
progress and reduce the incentive to modernize.
In conclusion it should be recalled that the Commission's statements
of the utility of quota agreements in promoting technical programs
182. Entente entre fabricants de verre plat, third report 218.
183. Entente entre fabricants de bandes transporteuses en caoutchouc, fourth report
313 (ministerial decision).
184. Ententes entre fabricants de demi-produits en m6taux cuivreux, Mar. 22, 1963.
185. Dufour, Deuxigme rapport sur les ententes existant entre les fabricants de demiproduits en cuivre et en laitor 4 (1963).
186. Id. at 13. This example is given in spite of the fact that the figures cited by
the reporter are not always consistent and that it was necessary to assume that the
quotas were not observed one year where there were no contrary indications. This
latter assumption could cause significant distortion since the excess of the production
over the quotas is averaged over three years.
In its second examination of the copper products industry, the Commission said that
the variation of the quotas tended to encourage each firm to keep its production and
its expansion in line with the industry as a whole if it wanted to preserve its share of
the market or increase it. Ententes entre fabricants de demi-produits en m6taux
cuivreux, Mar. 22, 1963.
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has been questioned for certain industries. Moreover. the restrictive
character of quotas should not be minimized even if they are not
enforced by penalties. The director of a trade association.,in an
industry which had been investigated by the Commission admitted
that his hardest job was to ensure that the quotas were observed.
He felt, however, that he had been successful and that the actual
production closely corresponded to the quotas.
The Commission has also examined several collusive bidding arrangements which have been used to divide the large orders let out
for bids by government agencies'87 or the French railway. 188 In
the Cast Steel' 89 case, although the companies apparently initially
denied the existence of any agreement, an examination of the facts
as set out in the administrative report leaves little doubt as to the
existence of an entente. This report describes several instances in
which the lowest bidders would make offers at identical or nearly
identical prices and the total of their separate offers would equal the
quantity desired by the French railway. 19 Other examples show that
for certain products, if a company received a particular contract, it
would automatically quote a high price the next time the same product
was let out for bids so as to let another firm receive the order.19'
The Commission condemns such practices without hesitation although
it has remarked that the gravity of a violation may be attenuated
by the fact that sales have dropped sharply' 92 or that the orders placed
by various governmental agencies were extremely irregular. 193 It
should be noted, however, that the Commission almost always manages to cite some attenuating circumstances in connection with its
recommendations that criminal proceedings not be instituted.
187. E.g., Entente entre fabricants de futs m6talliques, second report 21.
188. E.g., Entente entre fabricants de coeurs d'aiguillages en acier moul6 au
manganese, fourth report, 311.
189. Entente dans rindustrie de 'acier moul6, fifth report 37. It is not clear
whether the parties finally admitted that they had bid collusively. There is no indication
of such an admission in either the report of the Service for Economic Investigation or

the reporter. THEUREAU & BARBELET, E~msr'm
(1960); FousRR, RAPPORT suR L'ENTENTE DANS

DANs L'INDUSTR1 DE L'Acm MOULr
L'NDUSTRIE DE L'AcIm MOULE (1962).

The Commission, however, has said that it will not consider justifications for restrictive
practices unless the existence of an entente is admitted. E.g., fourth report 306. Since
the Commission considered whether the entente could be justified under article 59 ter, it
could be assumed that the parties had admitted bidding collusively. If there was no
such admission, this case does not necessarily indicate a major change in the Commission's attitude as there were other restrictive practices admitted by the members of
the entente and the commission may have considered these admissions sufficient to
allow it to examine the justification presented.
190. THEUREAU & BARBLET, op. cit. supra note 189, at 63-65.
191. Id. at 65-68.
192. Entente entre fabricants de fits m6talliques, second report 21.
193. Entente entre fabricants de fils et cables 6lectriques isol6s, second report 25.
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I It would seem that collusive bidding may be much more widespread
than the existence of only three cases would indicate. Interviews
with members of trade associations in industries which the Commission has investigated revealed another two instances. In one a
member of the trade association explained that the investigation by
the Service for Economic Investigations was initiated because one
of the companies bidding on a government contract accidentally
enclosed with its bid a letter from the trade association telling it
for how much to bid and at what price. He continued that this
mistake itself probably would have caused no difficulties as the
government agency concerned knew all about the entente. However,
an employee of the agency sent the letter to the Service for Economic
Investigations. In the other case, even after the Commission had
expressly condemned the price fixing in the industry, it was admitted
that each member of the entente was instructed, that, on being
approached by a governmental purchaser, he should immediately
telephone the trade association to find out the price and if it was a
large order, the quantity which he should quote.

2. Risk Sharing.-The various arrangements by which a group of
firms agree to share the risks of profit and loss are very much a
product of the "Malthusian" theories of the thirties and as such
are disapproved by the Commission. The most common type of
risk sharing is the penalty and indemnity clauses. The same result
can be, reached through agreements which obligate firms which have
exceeded their quotas to place orders with those which have fallen
short.194 Risk sharing may also take the form of indemnities which
are paid to companies which have ceased all activity, 95 or of arrangements which allow companies which have shut down to sell
their quotas. 1 6

The Commission has examined several fairly elaborate agreements
designed to equalize expenses or profits. An agreement, no longer
in force, in the glass industry was designed to ensure that the members
of an entente, although observing the overall quotas, would not try
to sell only the articles for which there were larger profit margins.
This arrangement was believed necessary because, within each
category of products for which a quota was set, there would be items
of greater or less profitability; and, as a practical matter, it was
impossible for each member of the entente to apply his quota rigor194. E.g., Ententes entre fabricants d'outils agricoles ALmain, third report 216.
195. E.g., Entente dans l'industrie et le commerce de la levure de panification, first
report 9. Exceptionally these indemnities have been allowed as a part of a far
reaching industry reorganization. E.g., Entente dans l'industrie de r6paratior du
mat6riel roulant ferroviaire, fourth report 315.
196. E.g., Entente pour l'organisation du march6 de la langouste, fourth report 318.
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ously to each individual product. 9 7 In another case a system was set
up to equalize the costs of all the members of the entente in so far as
the price of the raw materials, the cost of transportation of the finished
product, the seasonal variations in sales prices, the bad debts, and
the expenses of sales agents. 198
The Commission has shown little sympathy for any of these risk
sharing practices, but its attitude is not as clear cut with regard to
associationsen participation. In general, the association en participation is a contract between two or more companies or individuals in
which they agree that either for a single project or for all of their
business the total receipts and disbursements of the various members
will be consolidated and the profits or losses shared according to fixed
percentages. The contract is not revealed to third parties. The association has no legal identity or capacity of its own and there is no
transfer of property to the association since each member agrees only
to contribute the use of the property. The individual companies will
continue to act and to appear as completely independent in buying
and selling and generally in carrying on their business. Usually one
of the members of the association will be chosen as manager, and
he will act in his own name and be the only one who is known to
third parties. Moreover, if the association is not considered to have
been legally disclosed, the members other than the manager are only
held to the terms of the contract forming the association. 199
In the Sickle; 00 case, the Commission condemned an association en
participationin which profits or losses were allocated among the five
members following fixed percentages and the products were sold
at a common price. The Commission stated that the legal form used
by the members of the entente made no difference as far as the
applicability of the antitrust laws was concerned.
In the Salt2°1 case, the Commission examined five regional ententes
which were arranged so as to exclude all competition among the
members of each entente. In the Midi, for example, one of the
two dominant companies managed an association en participation
and all the producers were obligated, with a very few exceptions, to
sell through it. After reimbursing each producer for his costs at a
fixed rate, the profits were then divided by allocating fifty-three per
cent of these earnings proportionally to the quotas granted each
197. Entente entre fabricants de verre plat, third report 218, and information given
by members of the industry.
198. Entente dans rindustrie de superphosphate, fifth report 18, and information
given by members of the industry.
199. RiET & ROBLOT, Tsrrrii ELiEMENTAIE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL § 860-75 (5e 6d.
1963).
200. Entente entre fabricants de faulx et faucilles, fifth report 26.
201. Entente dans Yindustrie du sel, fifth report 39.
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producer and forty-seven per cent following another scale. The
Commission recognized that these measures eliminated all competition among the members of each regional entente.20 2 Because of
the extremely complicated and artificial nature of the structure of the
salt industry, which included measures to subsidize the producers
in one region where the salt pans were uneconomical and often
a
run as one-family businesses, the Commission only recommended
23
study of how competition in the salt industry could be restored.
The associations en participationin the Sickle and Salt cases effectively eliminated competition and the Commission's disapproval
would seem to have been a sound policy. In two examinations of
the copper, semi-finished products industry, however, no reference
was made to the various associations en participation.
In 1945 Tr6fileries et Laminoirs du Havre (T.L.H.) and Compagnie
Francaise des M6taux (C.F.M.), two of the largest French manufacturing companies, established an associationen participation(AP1)
for the manufacture and sale of certain products which constituted
2 04
a significant part of the total production of the two companies.
The receipts and disbursements were pooled under this agreement
and the profits were shared by allocating 52.406 per cent to T.L.H.
and 47.594 per cent to C.F.M. In 1955 a second association en participation (AP2) was established between AP1 and the principal
competitor, Compagnie G6n6rale du Duralumin et du Cuivre
(Cegedur). AP2 followed the same form as the first and the profits
2
were divided: 69 per cent to AP1 and 31 per cent to Cegedur. 1
In 1957 T.L.H. and C.F.M. set up a common sales agency. In 1962
they merged,206 but apparently AP2 continued to exist.
In the First Copper Products207 case the Commission did not refer
to the associations and said only that the creation of large and
modem production facilities had been encouraged by specialization
agreements between the large manufacturers and that these agreements were sometimes complemented by common sales or export
agencies. The Minister, noting in his decision that two of the
largest companies had merged their sales apparatus and had formed an
association en participation, stated that these agreements should be
called to the Commission's attention when it re-examined the en202. Lorge, Rapport sur la situation des producteurs de sels au regard des dispositions
du d6cret no. 53.704 du 9 aout 1953, relatives aux ententes professionnelles 39-43
(1957) (administrative report).
203. Entente dans l'industrie du sel, fifth report 39.
204. Dufour, op. cit. supra note 185, at 21.
205. Id. at 22.

206. Id. at 25.
207. Entente entre fabricants de demi-produits en m6taux cuivreux, fourth report 307.
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tente.20 a However, when in 1962 he again asked the Commission
2 9
to study the industry, the Minister did not raise the question. 0
While the reporter did outline the factual situation, he gave no
opinion as to the desirability of the agreements.
These associations were of major importance. The company formed
by the merger of T.L.H. and C.F.M. represented 32 per cent of the
market in 1962 as compared with 16 per cent for Cegedur, the other
member of the association and the second largest company.210 Moreover, the reporter said that it seemed to him that associations en
participation were still more widespread in the industry than his
report would indicate.21 ' As a conclusion he noted:
Competition seems to continue in the industry in spite of the concentration
through stock ownership and the ties of all sorts between companies. This

finding is not entirely paradoxical; it seems that, in spite of the interlocking
interests, a certain competition exists between the executives of the companies. This rivalry among the directors, which is a cause as well as an effect
of the dynamism of the industry, tends to limit in a certain measure the
and financial
efforts of the entente as well as the effects of the commercial
212

ties. It also preserves a certain spirit of competition.

213
The Commission did not examine the associations in its opinion.
It would seem essential, however, that the Commission examine such
agreements which suppress all competition among a group of companies and eliminate the incentive for any firm to try to increase
its share of the market since such a change will probably have no
effect on the profits that it will receive under the agreement setting
up the associationen participation. The arrangement in the Sickle214case was condemned, but this disapproval seems to have resulted
largely from the fact that one of the members wanted to withdraw
and that he was ready to sell his products at prices lower than those
on a common price list established by the members of the entente.
An association en participationmoreover appears to have become
an important form of entente. It has been said that to achieve cooperation between firms at the level of production or of distribution,
"it seems that the form which is most satisfactory is that of the association en participationwhich, while leaving a great flexibility in the
means used, permits a division for a fairly long period of profits
realized following a fixed scale." 215

208. Id. at 308 (ministerial decision).
209. Letter of the Secr6taire d'Etat au commerce interieur to the President of the
Commission technique des ententes, Mar. 26, 1962.
210. Dufour, op. cit. supra note 185, at 26.
211. Id. at 23.
212. Id. at 28.
213. Ententes entre fabricants de demi-produits en m6.taux cuivreux, Mar. 22, 1963.
214. Entre entre fabricants de faulx et faucilles, fifth report 26, and see text accompanying notes 301-06 infra.
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B. Price Fixing and DiscriminatoryPricing
In the area of price fixing and discriminatory pricing a practice may
be attacked both under article 59, as interpreted by the Commission,
and under article 37, enforced by the courts without the intervention
of the Commission.
Article 37(4) provides that it will be considered as equivalent to
illegal pricing for "any person to confer, maintain, or to impose minimum prices for goods or services or minimum commercial margins
either by means of price lists or through ententes, no matter what
the form." This statutory wording would seem applicable both to
vertical resale price maintenance and to horizontal price fixing agreements. Moreover, the preamble to the decree of August 9, 1953, states
that the prohibiiion against fixing minimum prices applies equally
to resale maintenance and to price fixing by ententes between producers 2 16 There has been no attempt, however, to apply article
37(4) to horizontal price fixing agreements. This restrictive interpretation may be based on a reading of the paragraph in article 37(4)
which provides that derogations may be granted in an exceptional
situation such as the first marketing of a new product. Such derogations would seem applicable only in the case of vertical price fixing.
There may also have been a desire to leave the control of horizontal
agreements to the Commission.
The two published administrative circulars which interpret article
37217 seem to be exclusively concerned with the problem of the
imposition of resale prices. The second circular remarks that the
purpose of articles 37(1) (a) and 37(4) is to maintain or re-establish
competition at the level of distribution.
Now competition which appears essentially in the establishment of prices

tends to disappear as a uniform minimum price is imposed on resellers.
ACTIONS COLLECTIVES (EXP-RIENCES DE COLLABORATION INTER-ENTERPMSES)

44 (1962).

Associations en participation represent only one of the numerous types of agreements
that joint French companies. Although the questions raised by such interfirm co-operation are beyond the scope of this paper, a study by Houssiaux can be noted. On
the basis of the year 1952 he found that among the 100 largest French companies
there were 127 instances in which stock* in one of these 100 largest companies was
owned by another in the group of the 100 largest. He also noted that there were 473
interlocking directors for these 100 companies. HoussiAux, LE Pouvosn DE MONOPOLI
236-40 (1958).
216. Decree No. 53-704, Aug. 9, 1953, [1953] J.0. 7045.
217. Circular, Feb. 15, 1954, [1954] J.O. 1566; Circular, Mar. 31, 1960, [1960]
J.O. 3048 [hereinafter cited as Fontanet circular]. See also the translation of parts
of an unpublished government memorandum prepared in answer to 35 hypothetical
cases relating to artticle 37(1) (a) posed by a working group made up of representatives of French trade associations and chambers of commerce in Goldstein, Administrative Shaping of French Refusal to Deal Legislation, 11 Am. J. Comp. L. 515, 523-34
(1962).
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Thus the primary object of218the measures under analysis is to forbid the
imposition of minimum prices.

This quotation shows an assumption that the only price fixing that
is prohibited by article 37(4) is that of resale prices. The detailed
analysis of the circular, moreover, considers only such vertical agreements. Furthermore, there are no reported cases which indicate
any attempt has been made to extend the prohibitions of article 37(4)
to purely horizontal agreements.
Article 37(1) (a) prohibits "habitually practicing discriminatory
sales terms or discriminatory price increases which are not justified
by corresponding increases in cost of supplying the product or the
service." The Fontanet circular explains that a seller who charges
different prices to different clients "should be ready to prove that
these differences correspond to variations in cost and not simply to
the nature of the business of the buyer";219 and the practice of
charging lower prices to wholesalers than to groups of retailers is
condemned.2° The circular states that "differences in prices between
clients should in general be justified, by differences in the quantities
sold."2 1 However, there is apparently no requirement that these
quantity discounts be justified by actual cost savings so as not to
result in favoring large buyers.
Violations of article 37 are usually investigated by the Service for
Economic Investigations, although the usual criminal law procedures
are not foreclosed.22 At the conclusion of the Service's investigation,
an administrative decision is made whether to drop the charges or to
try, with the cooperation of the public prosecutor, to reach e compromise agreement with the person under investigation, or whether
criminal proceedings should be instituted. 223 Compromise agreements
are frequently reached wherein criminal proceedings will be abandoned and the party under investigation will admit his guilt, perhaps
paying a fine or giving up any goods which have been seized by
the government.2 Unlike the procedure under article 59, there have
218. Fontanet Circular, introduction. The circular does say that it will not consider
questions relative to ententes, but this statement seems to be a reference to the exclusion of questions relative to article 59 and not intended to limit the interpretation of
article 37.
219. Id., tit. II, ch. II, sec. II.
220. Id., tit. II, ch. II, sec. II, § 3.

221. Ibid.

222. Souleau, Les r6gles particulidres,de constatation, de poursuite et de r6pression

etablies par l'ardonnance n. 45-1484 du 30 juin 1945, Juris-Classeur p6nal, Lois
p6nales annexes, Infractions 6conomiques I, 10.
223. Ordinance No. 45-1484, June 30, 1945, [1945] J.O. 4156, as amended, Law
65-549, July 9, 1965, [1965] J.O. 5915, see also Decree No. 65-787, Sept. 11, 1965,
[1965] J.O. 8279, Souleau, op. cit. supra note 221, at 90-119.
294. SouLEvu, op. cit. supra note 222, at 90-119.
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been a substantial number of criminal proceedings under article 372
and it would seem that this law is beginning to take effect.
In the cases which the Commission has examined there are numerous instances where there appear to have been violations of article
37, but it has preferred to proceed under article 59. In one case
the Commission said that it was not within its jurisdiction to consider
whether the fixing of commissions charged fell under article 37(4).220
Probably this hesitancy is caused by the language of article 59 quater
which defines the jurisdiction of the Commission as the examination
of "possible violations of article 59 bis and also the justifications which
may be furnished under article 59 ter." While this may be a sound
interpretation of the statutory wording, it would seem undesirable for
two separate bodies of law on the legality of price fixing and discriminatory pricing to develop. Furthermore, the express prohibitions of article 37 would seem to exclude the possibility of justifying
an agreement under the general language of article 59.227 The opinion
of the Cour d'Appel of Amiens, in a case concerning the legality
of an exclusive dealing contract under article 37, lends some support
to this conclusion.
But considering that if the Commission technique des ententes could recommend the exoneration of a practice restraining competition which was a

necessary counterpart of a technical program or a program favorable to
economic progress, its opinion has no effect in relation to the offenses
enumerated by article 37(1) (a) and article 37(4) which are already before
the courts.2 2 8

A conflict usually will not arise in the case of horizontal price fixing
since the Commission finds little justification for this practice, but
several of the discriminatory rebate provisions approved by the
Commission could be considered to violate article 37(1(a).
225. See generally Souleau, Pratiques anticoncurrentielles et autres infractions assimies al la pratique de prix illicite, Juris-Classeur P6nal, Lois p6nales annexes, Infrac-tions 6conomiques, III,

3-75.

226. Affaires "Ententes professionnelles dans le domaine de la publicit6," third report
220. But see Entente entre fabricants de lampes 6lectriques, second report 22.
227. See BLAIsE, LE STATUT JURtDIQUE DES ENTENTES iCONOMXQUES DANS LE DROIT
FRANCAIS Er LE DROrr DES CommuNAumis EuRoPEE-NES 360-63 (1964).

It should be

noted, however, that the apparently unqualified prohibition against refusing to sell
contained in article 37(1) has not stopped the courts from approving exclusive

dealing contracts which contribute to a sound organization of the distribution of
products. Guy6not, ETUD JUruDIQUE ET ]CONOMIQUE DES CONVENTIONS D'EXCLUSIVITk
D. VENTS, [1965] Dr. soc. 1,5.
228. Nicholas et Soci6t6 Brandt, Cour d'Appel d'Amiens, May 9, 1963, [1963] J.C.P.
II. 13222, [19631 Gaz. Pal. I. 426, aff'd, Cour de Cassation (Ch. crim.), Oct. 22, 1964,
[1964] Bull. crim. 591, [1964] D. II 753 (note J.-L.C.), [1964] Gaz. Pal. II. 386.
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1. Price fixing.-The fixing of prices has been condemned by the
Commission as protecting marginal enterprises and discouraging increases in the production of the more efficient- firms. 2 29 The reasons
given for opposing price fixing agreements are largely the same as
those advanced to condemn rigid quota agreements. The Commission, however, has approved few price fixing arrangements. Any
desirable market stability apparently should be secured by flexible
quota agreements.
In the Yeast3 case, the Commission condemned an agreement
which included production quotas, payments to closed factories,
a geographical division of the market, and price fixing. Such an
entente was believed to result in a freezing of the market structure and
to prevent the expansion of the better situated firms. Also, by basing
sales prices on the costs of the less efficient firms, the entente gave the
more efficient firms added profits which did not result from an 'expansion which would have been beneficial to the economy.
As with quota agreements, penalties231 or other devices to encourage
strict adherence to price lists23 have been condemned. A distinction
might be drawn between agreements which fix definite prices and
those which only suggest prices. The facts of the case, however, often
do not allow such a distinction to be made, and it probably should only
be noted that the Commission prefers the less rigid arrangements. The
Commission seems to have adopted a more severe approach toward
price agreements in its fifth report. This change can be highlighted
by an examination of two cases involving the rubber industry.Y3 In
each, the manufacturers had formed ententes which were linked with
an industry-wide association, the Union professionnelle du caoutchouc.
In 1958 the Commission examined an entente among the manufacturers of conveyor belts. z 4 The agreement provided for the establishment of quotas and a list of recommended prices and discounts.
Although recognizing that suggested price lists were incompatible
with the reductions in prices to be expected under free competition,
the Commission asked only that the quotas be made more flexible,
that there be efforts to make technical improvements and increase
the volume of exports. The Minister, however, adopted a more
229. Entente dans F'industrie et le commerce de la levure de panification, first report 9.

230. ibid.
231. Entente pour rorganisation du march6 de la langouste, third report 318.
232. Entente entre fabricants de fils et cables 6lectriques isol6s, second report 25.
233. Entente entre fabricants de bandes transporteuses en caoutchouc, fourth report
312, Entente entre fabricants de tuyaux de caoutchouc, fifth report 18.
234. Entente entre fabricants de bandes transporteuses en caoutchouc, fourth report
312.
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severe position and prohibited publication of lists of suggested prices
and discounts.23
Two years later the Commission examined an entente between the
manufacturers of rubber tubing which was set up under a contract
which was practically indentical to the conveyor belt agreement.236
In this case, however, the Commission declared that the entente had
as its main purpose an elimination of price competition and that
this restriction was assured principally by the use of suggested price
lists. It then dismissed the attempts at justification under article 59
ter by remarking that the same measures had been carried out by nonmembers of the entente and it recommended that the entente be
dissolved within three months after the ministerial decision.
The Commission, however, has not adopted a per se rule against
price fixing because apparently in certain situations it sees no alternative to price agreements. In the Crayfish Wholesalersm case, an entente of buyers guaranteed fishermen a minimum price for two kinds
of crayfish in exchange for the exclusive right to buy these two types.
A quota agreement would hardly have been feasible, and even if
instituted, would not have eliminated the fluctuations in price which
depended upon the time of reaching port. The Commission recognized
the need for an organization of the market to stabilize the price,
guarantee the fishermen a fair price, favor the equipment of new
boats and establish the basis for an extension of the domestic and
foreign sales. Nevertheless, wanting to avoid practices which unnecessarily restricted competition, it recommended that the market
organization be established with governmental agreement and pursuant to an ordinance relating to fishing.
In the Optical Glass218 case, six producers which accounted for
eighty per cent of the market had joined in an agreement providing
for technical collaboration, a common sales price, and a system of
discounts based on the total amount of a client's purchases from all
the members of the entente. While noting that the common price
list contributed to high retail prices, to abnormally large profits for
the better placed firms, and to the prevention of the less well placed
enterprises from being forced to give up the manufacture of certain
high cost products, the Commission did not suggest an elimination
of the price lists but recommended that prices be reduced within
two years. This solution abandons reliance on competition to regu235. Id. at 313 (ministerial decision).
236. Entente entre fabricants de tuyaux en caoutchouc, fifth report 18, and information given by members of the industry.
237. Entente pour l'organisation du marchede la langouste, fourth report 318.
238. Entente dans l'industrie des verres d'optique m6dicale et de luneterrie, fifth
report 31.
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late the market and adopts a policy of directly acting on prices, the
policy of price control. In examining the market the Commission
found that retail purchasers were more concerned about having a
personal confidence in their optician and his product than about the
price. The opticians also followed a suggested retail price scale
which allowed a 100 per cent to 200 per cent markup, and exerted
no pressure on the manufacturers to lower their prices. In this situation the Commission may have concluded that competition could not
be expected and that it should thus try to act more directly on the
price. While this might be a sound analysis, it would seem that such
a solution could be better carried out under the usual price control
regulations2 9 than by the time-consuming procedure under article
59. Moreover, in the case it examined immediately before the
Optical Glass case, it had stated that, in the absence of competition
resulting from a merger which concentrated ninety-five per cent
of the domestic production in one firm, the sales price could only be
limited by price control.m It thus recommended that the price regulation be continued and an investigation be made to establish a new
price schedule.
2. Discriminatory Pricing.-The ententes examined by the Commission have frequently employed discriminatory practices, such as
discount arrangements which encourage customers to purchase only
from producers belonging to the entente 4 1 and special rates on sales
between entente members.
The Commission has disapproved several discriminatory practices as not economically justifiable. 243 These
economic criteria, however, are independent of article 37(1) (a) and
have led to results which would seem to conflict with article 37(1) (a).
Probably the discriminatory practice most often considered by the
Commission provide for graduated scales of rebates based upon the
quantity which a customer purchases from all the members of an
entente, and which have been called "rebate cartels." Initially, the
Commission provides for graduated scales of rebates based upon the
directed against nonmembers of the entente from that in which there
were no dissident firms and new entry was extremely unlikely under
the particular economic conditions. In the latter case, the discount
arrangements could be approved if they contributed to eliminating
excessively dispersed distribution and sales networks. 24 In a case
contained in the fourth report, the Minister explained that rebates
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

See generally FRANcK, LEs r,=x (3e 6d. refondue 1964).
Entente dans l'industrie des tuyaux en fonte, fifth report 29.
E.g., Ententes entre fabricants d'outils agrioles A main, third report 216.
E.g., Entente fabricants de culots de lampes 6lectriques, second report 23.
E.g., Entente entre fabricants de fourches et crocs, fifth report 35.

244. Third report 214.
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based on the total purchases from entente members could help
increase specialization if they were refused to all clients who abusively
dispersed their orders. 245 Under the particular circumstances, he
considered as objectionable the ordering of an identical product from
more than two manufacturers if the article was mass produced and
from more than one if it was not.
Neither the Commission nor the Minister seems to have initially
considered whether rebate cartels were in violation of article
37(1) (a). The first possibility of conflict would arise in a situation in
which there were foreign manufacturers. If an entente included all
domestic producers, a buyer who placed all his orders with domestic
producers would be charged a lower price than one who divided them
among French and foreign enterprises. Other difficulties would arise
from the type of discount arrangement recommended by the Minister
to encourage specialization. Taking the recommendations made in
the cited case, a client who made a single purchase of X units of the
product from one entente member would be entitled to a discount
while another who bought 3X of the same product but divided his
order equally among three members would be denied one. Also a
client who bought X of the article from each of two members of the
entente would have his discount calculated upon 2X, while if he
divided his orders among a member and a nonmember his rebate
would be based on X.
In its fifth report, the Commission seemed to have abandoned
the attempt to draw distinctions between the different arrangements
which calculate discounts on the total amount purchased from all
members of an entente and said
The position of the commission which was initially quite subtle (see third
report 214) has become more firm (see, e.g., Entente entre fabricants de
linol6um, fifth report 33) especially in the case where nonmembers of the
entente are of more than a negligible importance. (Entente dans l'industrie
des verres droptique m~dicale et do lunetterie, fifth report 31). This practice
which has the characteristics of a 'rebate cartel' has the 'well known result
of discouraging customers from buying from nonmembers of the entente or
from foreign sellers' and, moreover, is 'likely to lead to discriminatory price
increases not justified by corresponding variations in cost.'

'industrie du fil mousse de nylon, fifth report 38) .246

(Entente dans

245. Entente entre fabricants de jantes et de guidons, fourth report 310 (ministerial
decision).
246. Fifth report 13. A certain evolution can be noted in the cases. Although they
all condemned the discount arrangements, the first two only cited article 59. Entente
dans l'industrie de verres d'optique m6dicale et de lunetterie, fifth report 31; Entente
entre fabricants de linol6um, fifth report 33. In the third case, however, the Commission
seemed to base its disapproval equally on the tendency for these practices to discourage
purchases from nonmembers, the usual ground for the Commission's condemnation under
article 59, and the fact that they caused discriminatory price increases which were not
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As well as apparently reversing the Commission's former position,
this quotation also refers to "discriminatory price increases not justified by corresponding variations in cost," which is the test of article

37(1) (a).
In its second examination of the semi-finished copper products industry24 7 the Commission, however, retreated from this position. The
Minister, in his letter conferring jurisdiction on the Commission, stated
that the rebate cartel had continued and that no new justifications
had been advanced. He declared that this practice could contribute
to excessive dispersion of orders, could hinder specialization, and
could not fail to result in discriminatory price increases falling under
article 37(1) (a).21 The reporter, however, disagreed and stated
that, in view of the well-informed clientele, the system of discounts
could have no other effect than to reduce prices. He added that the
practice would not be of a reprehensible character unless it was
applied in a discriminatory manner to the advantage of certain
customers and to the detriment of others.2 49 These conclusions do
not, however, answer the questions raised by the existence of foreign
producers and nonmembers of the entente.
The Commission followed the conclusions of the reporter and said
Considering that the trade discounts are a traditional way of doing business
with a well-informed industrial clientele which is concerned about the quality
of the products and able to provoke competition; that the discounts consist
in rebates given at the end of the year by each company to each of its
clients in proportion to the total orders placed by the customer with all the
producers in the entente and with the principal sellers connected with it;
that although the entente discounts have as a goal to attract clients toward
members of the entente, it is apparent from the investigation that in this
case and especially because of their small size they have not tended to
disturb the conditions of competition and cannot be assimilated to the
practice of "dumping."Z 0

The Commission has here adopted a line of reasoning even more
questionable than its distinction between those entente discounts
which encourage and those which hinder specialization. The power
of the buyers is certainly important, but the argument based on the
fact that the discounts have continued for a long time and are not
very large seems difficult to defend. The Commission does not suggest
justified by cost differences, the criteria of article 37(1)(a). Entente dans l'industrie
du fil mousse de nylon, fifth report 38. The Minister specifically referred to article
37(1) (a) in each case.
247. Ententes entre fabricants de demi-produits en m6taux cuivreux, Mar 22, 1963.
248. Letter from Secr6taire d'Etat au commerce int6rieur to the President of the
Commission technique des ententes, Mar. 26, 1962.
249. DUFOUR, DEuxInrz RAPPORT SUR LES ENTENTES EXISTANT ENTE LES FABIUCANTS
DE DEMI-PnODUrrs EN CUIVRE =r EN LArrom 33 (1963).
250. Ententes entre fabricants de demi-produits en m6taux cuivreux, Mar. 22, 1963.
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that such discounts in any way contribute to economic progress.
Finally, the reference to dumping seems to be wholly irrelevant.
Another type of discriminatory pricing occurs when entente members sell to each other at a rate lower than to other purchasers. 2 1
This practice has been condemned as adding unnecessary costs by
increasing the number of middlemen.2 2 These special discounts could
also be compared to the profit equalization schemes already examined. If a firm cannot profitably sell goods which it does not
make without a special discount from the actual manufacturer, this
manufacturer, assuming that he could otherwise sell the goods at
their full price, is in effect giving up some of his normal profit to
the nonproducing firm.
These special discounts often form part of specialization agreements
so as to allow firms to continue to sell products which they have
ceased to manufacture,253 thus assuring themselves of a certain profit
even if they lose money in selling the narrower more specialized line
of products which they actually make. These practices have the same
goal of stabilizing a firm's market as quota agreements. Like quotas,
they may be allowed temporarily, but they should be gradually
eliminated.2
In a few cases the Commission has disapproved discriminatory
pricing without mention of the factual situation. However, when
the Commission's recommendation in the Plate Glass25 case is placed

in the factual situation disclosed by members of the industry, a
possibility of conflict with article 37(1) (a) arises. The Commission
and the Minister noted in passing that the manufacturers had agreed
to modify their discount system to eliminate all discrimination. It
was explained, however, that in place of a complicated system of
about thirty different discount scales which had once been in force,
the manufacturers had agreed to adopt three different discount lists:
one for the Paris region, one for cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants, and a third for those cities with less than 100,000 inhabitants. It would seem that this system, based on the arbitrary
assumption that it was more difficult to sell glass in smaller cities
and towns than in Paris, would not be acceptable under article
37(1) (a).
With price fixing and discriminatory pricing, the Commission disapproves those practices which hinder the implementation of technical
251. E.g., Ententes entre fabricants d'outils agrocoles A main, third report 216.
252. Ibid.
253. See TEnmONT, op. cit. supra note 215, at 38.

254. Ententes entre fabricants d'outils agricoles a main, third report 217 (ministerial
decision).
255. Entente entre fabricants de verre plat, third report 218.
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programs, concentration of industries, and lowering of prices. In the
case of price fixing, the Commission's recommendations generally increase competition except in those cases where the Commission feels
that competition is undesirable2- or unworkable. 257 As far as discriminatory pricing, an analysis of the Commission's position is more difficult. The position that it took against rebate cartels in its fifth report
temporarily removed the major difficulty, but the distinctions intro2 5a case hardly seem acceptable
duced in the Second Copper Products
under article 37(1)(a). Moreover, it does not seem that article
37(1) (a) would permit special rebates among members of an entente
who have concluded a specialization agreement or discount scales
based on population as in the Plate Glass59 case.
V. ThE FPRENCH ANTITRUST LAWS

AND OTHER

LEGISLATION AFFECrING COMPETITION

A consideration of the relationship between the French antitrust
laws and other legislation which may affect competition should start
with an examination of article 59 ter, 10 which states that ententes
"which result from the application of a legislative provision or a
regulation" do not fall under article 59 bis. The Commission has
given a narrow construction to this exception. It has noted that it
would probably never have occasion to apply article 59 ter, 10 directly.
In such a case the restrictive practices would have been made obligatory by the legislature or the administration, and the Commission
believes this fact could be easily determined without consulting it.260
The Freight261 case, however, was not far from this hypothesis. The
Commission found that the provisions of the agreement were either
(1) the direct result of a law or regulation or part of an agreement
drawn up by the trade association which, once approved by the
government, had become compulsory; or, (2) to the extent that the
provisions resulted from the initiative of the entente, mere accessory
262
clauses without direct effect on the price.
256. Entente pour l'organisation du march6 de la langouste, fourth report 318.
257. Entente dans l'industrie des verres d'optique m6dicale et de lunetterie, fifth
report 31.

258. Ententes entre fabricants de demi-produits en m6taux cuivreux, Mar. 22, 1963.
259. Entente entre fabricants de verre plat, third report 218.
260. Fourth report 306.

261. Entente entre affrcteurs pour les exp6ditions de charbons par voies navigables,
second report 20.
262. The Commission did not cite article 59 ter, 10 in its opinion, and, in the second
report, it characterized the case as a noncompetitive situation which resulted from
factors unrelated to the entente, that is, the intervention of the legislature and the
government. It noted that this situation should be distinguished from the exception of
article 59 ter, 1" for ententes which themselves resulted from a law or regulation.
Second report 18. The Paris Cour d'Appel has stated that the French Radio was
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The role of ententes in establishing provisions complementary to
the legal regulation of an industry is extremely limited. In the
Millingm case, the industry was subject to regulations which prohibited the opening of new mills and limited the activity of existing
ones. The Commission concluded that this statute was an exception
to the principle of free competition and that no additional restrictive
practices should be permitted. It condemned the entente, which had
contributed, to a situation in which its members were operating at
less than forty-five per cent of capacity while nonmembers were producing at more than seventy per cent.2 4 It conceded that there could
be ententes which usefully complemented an economicaly sound
statutory regulation; but in the Milling case, it seemed to look with
disfavor on the regulation. The Minister in his decision said that the
various restrictions added by the entente were contrary not only to
article 59 bis but also to the decrees regulating the grain market.
In the Salt2 65 case, the Commission seems to have eliminated the
possibility that restrictive practices may be justified as complementary
to a legal regulation. It stated that even though the only purpose
of the arrangements set up by the various ententes was to work toward
the same goal as that desired by the legislature, these practices could
not be considered as resulting from the application of a law. It has
also refused to admit that the fact that an entente has received a
certain encouragement from the government would provide a justification under article 59 ter, 1°.66
The question of the relationship between the antitrust laws and
the patent and trademark laws is more complex. On the one hand,
the Commission seems to believe that the mere fact that an entente
is set up under an otherwise valid patent or trademark license does
not in any way limit its investigation. Yet the Commission apparently
attaches great importance to the existence of patent and tr'demark
rights.
In the Magnesiu 2O6 7 case the Socie'te ge'nrale du magnesium
(SGM) entered into licensing contracts with four foundries which
exempted under article 59 ter, 1". Fed6ration nationale des cin6mas francais v. Radiodiffusion-T6l6vision Francaise, Cour d' Appel de Paris Mar. 18, 1965, [19651; J.C.P. II
14208, (note Lyon-Caen [1965] D. somm. 108.
263. Entente dans lindustrie de la meunerie parisienne, fourth report 316, see generally Ousset, "La concurrence imparfaite dans les industries agricoles et alimentaires,"
in Les formes modernes de la concurrence 257, 290-99.
264. Id.at 317 (ministerial decision).
265. Entente dans l'industrie du sel, fifth report 39.
266. Entente entre fabricants de bandes transporteuses en caoutchouc, fourth report
312.
267. Entente dans rindustrie du magn6sium, first report 10. The Commission does
not indicate the nature of the patent which formed the basis of the licensing agreement
but it seems to have concerned the alloys which were made by the foundries.

COMPETITION AND PROGRESS

provided for reciprocal technical co-operation. The SGM also agreed
to supply them with magnesium at the current price in exchange
for the foundries' agreement not to buy magnesium elsewhere, to
return all scrap metal and neither to buy scrap from third parties nor
to resell unprocessed magnesium. Another contract with a fifth
foundry, S.N.E.C.M.A., generally limited SGM's sales to the foundry's
requirements in casting pieces which would later be used in machines
it made. The Commission decided that it could examine these agreements and pointed out that there were other limits on patent rights
drawn from the theory of abuse of monopoly, the needs of national
defense, and the desire to protect public health. It concluded that
although patent rights should be assured of as great a stability as
possible,
The considerations which lead to the attempt to find in each case the legal
solution which best conforms to the economic well-being do not allow
practices which within an entente make use of rights drawn from patent
8
26
law to escape the examination of the Commission.

The Commission seems to have believed that in general the restrictions were justified. However, the Secretary of the Air Force had
declared that since S.N.E.C.M.A. could not sell the pieces that it
cast, the manufacturers of airplane motors could procure such pieces
only from a single source. He felt that in this situation the regularity
of production could not be assured in the event that the single manufacturer ran into unforeseen difficulties, and there might be technical
stagnation. The Commission accepted this interpretation with reservations but concluded that, on such a question relating to the national
defense, the Secretary's opinion was conclusive. The Commission
did not examine the validity of the restrictive clauses in the licensing
contracts between SGM and the other four foundries except to say
that their provisions helped protect the members of the entente at
all levels of the production; and it recommended only that the government should examine with the members of the entente what
measures would tend to assure a supply of magnesium to users at a
price low enough to favor an increase in sales.
In the Nylon Yarn2 6 case the Commission also considered the relationship between article 59 and patents and trademarks. Again it
sweepingly defined its jurisdiction:
Even though the obligations which legally result from the existence of

patents or trademarks and which concern the sales or distribution of a
product are likely to limit competition, an entente set up between the
holders, licensees and sublicensees of patents or trademarks cannot be
268. Ibid.
269. Ententre dans l'industrie du fil mousse de nylon, fifth report 38.
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regarded, in itself, as constituting an entente in the sense of article 59 ter,
10270

A contract between the foreign holder of patents on a certain type
of loom and an entente provided that if these looms were made in
France they could not be sold to any but entente members or to
those working exclusively for entente members. An agreement had
also been reached with the principal foreign manufacturers to prevent
the importation of competing looms. The Commission found that,
as a result of these agreements, nonmembers of the entente had
experienced great difficulties in obtaining modern equipment. It
said, however, that this restrictive scheme had been forced on the
entente by the foreign owner of the patents; and that if the entente
had not agreed to these conditions, the introduction of these looms
into France and the development of that branch of the nylon industry would have been delayed. Although it was noted that similar
restrictive clauses had been made a part of new patent licenses
granted by a French company which was a member of the entente,
the Commission merely said that such restrictions were no longer
an effective block to competition since nonmembers of the entente
no longer had difficulty in buying imported machinery.
In conclusion, it would seem that the Commission's broad assumption of jurisdiction over patent and trademark agreements is balanced
by its willingness to allow restrictive practices which would probably
not otherwise be approved. This analysis however cannot be pursued
very far since the Commission nowhere indicates expressly what
importance it attributes to the existence of a patent or trademark and
often does not clearly describe the patent or trademark to which the
restrictive practice is tied. It should be stressed, however, that in the
Nylon Yarn2 71 case the Commission approved the actions of an entente,
for the past, because they had permitted the introduction of efficient
looms in France, and, for the present, because they did not constitute
an effective obstacle to competition.
VI.

APPLICATION OF TE

COiMISSION'S RqECOMMENDATIONS

Probably the first question concerns the imposition of penalties for
the violation of the provisions of article 59. In theory they are very
severe,2 72 but in practice they have little chance of being applied.
270. Ibid.
271. Ibid.
272. The penalties include imprisonment from 2 months to 2 years and a fine of
from 60 francs to 200,000 francs or one of the two. Ordinance 45-1484, June 30, 1945,
[19451 J.O. 4156, as amended, Law 65-549, July 9, 1965, [1965] J.O. 5915, art. 40.
Until the 1965 amendments the sanctions were imprisonment of from two to five years

and a fine of from 60 francs to 3 million francs or one of the two. See also Souleau,
op. cit. supra note 222, at 143-80.
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'The Commission has declared that the draftsmen's intention was
not only to repress restrictive practices, but also
to ...

[open] the way to a job more difficult, but also more positive; that

is, it could be said, an education leading to if not a spontaneous at least an
273
accepted rectification of the practices contrary to public policy

Seven years after it was established, the President of the Commission
declared
From the moment when the principles are fixed, it is the task of the Administration to assure that they are respected, this task moreover, will be
facilitated by the fact that, at least it can be hoped, the persons under
knowing their duty, will for the most part tend to follow the
investigation
4
27

law.

The policy expressed in these quotations has been followed. Neither
the Commission nor the Minister has ever recommended criminal sanctions, and those charged with enforcing the laws seem to feel that it
would be an outrage to bring respectable businessmen before the
criminal courts for violation of the antitrust laws. One high governmental official, has proposed another and perhaps a more convincing
explanation, remarking that the wartime black market and price legislation, which were often accompanied with excessively severe penalties, had engendered in the courts a profound distrust of all
"economic legislation." He further stated that it has been thought that,
with this background, courts would be extremely reluctant to impose
severe penalties for violation of the antitrust laws just as they had been
reluctant to apply the penalties provided by the black market laws.
Thus it was feared that criminal proceedings might well result in a
large number of acquittals and the imposition of penalties which were
so insignificant as to diminish the importance of the antitrust laws.
In actuality, the recommendations of the Commission are implemented through negotiations between the Minister and the members of
the entente. Since the Minister's demands have not been very severe,
the members of the entente have been largely willing to settle on
his terms. There have been no divestitures ordered or patents required
to be compulsorily licensed. The positive recommendations such as
increasing research or specialization, moreover, may be desired by
members of the industry. Also, with the mass of governmental intervention including price control, which is enforced by the same
governmental body as the antitrust laws, it would seem to be a bad
policy to disregard the Minister's requests. Presumably, however, the
273. First report 2.
274. Tout~e, Les ententes professionnelles, [1960] Conseil d'Etat, Etudes et Documents 161, 171.
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members of an entente could be obstinate enough to force the
Minister to send a case to the public prosecutor.
For the implementation of its recommendations, the Commission
has frequently asked the government to carry out a general surveillance of an industry which may include periodic reports to the
Minister,

75

or a request to the Minister to decide, after a probationary

period, whether it was appropriate to again ask the Commission for its
advice. 276 The Commission has also requested the government to make
studies of whether price control could be eliminated 2 " and to cooperate with ententes in studying how competition could be increased.278 It has asked for the establishment of committees to improve the relationships between manufacturers and governmental
purchasers2 79 or to study how to change certain traditional trade
arrangements.m Further it has recommended that an entente be
reorganized under governmental supervision.281
Usually there is no disclosure of the results of this governmental
intervention, but a few documents were published after the Advertising 2 case. The Commission had examined a market tightly tied
up with (1) indemnities paid to agencies who lost clients by the
agencies which acquired the accounts, (2) fixed rates, (3) a professional card, and (4) a system of enforcement which included the
agreement of the press not to deal with any agency which did not
have the professional card. The Commission asked for the immediate
abolition of these practices although agreeing to allow the continuation of the professional card until a reorganization of the structure of
the business under governmental supervision could be carried out. It
also suggested that a committee including representatives of agencies,
the press and other media, and the clients be established. A series of
ministerial letters, however, cut back these recommendations. The
first proposed, as had the Commission, that a committee be established
and that the granting of the professional card be made dependent
only upon professional competence, morality, and, in appropriate cases,
solvency. 283 With the other practices it only said that charges should
275. Entente entre fabricants de bandes transporteuses en caoutchouc, fourth report
312.

276. See, e.g., fifth report 10-11.
277. E.g., Entente dans rindustrie du sel, fifth report 39.

278.
13.
279.
280.
220.
281.
282.
220.
283.

Entente entre fabricants de meules et produits abrasifs agglom6 r6s, first report
E.g., Entente entre fabricants de flls et cables 6lectriques isol6s, second report 25,
Affaires "Ententes professionelles dans le domaine de la publicit6," third report
Entente pour lorganisation du march6 de la langouste, fourth report 318.
Affaires "Ententes professionnelles dans le domaine de la publicit6," third report

Id. at 223 (ministerial letter of Mar. 5, 1958).
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be revised to correspond to the services actually rendered and that
the prohibition of rebates was contrary to the provisions of article 37.
These changes, he believed, would render the system of indemnities
useless. The Minister, however, added that such a reform should
not be a bar to compensation following the sale of a business, the
provisions of a contract, or the general principles of civil liability.
A year later, the succeeding Minister wrote that the recommendations
of the Commission did not demand the suppression of the card but
that, if it were continued, its unofficial nature should be made clear
and that the newspaper trade associations should not oblige their
members to deal only with holders of these cards. 284 He also noted
that rates were no longer fixed and said that a committee would be
appointed to study a form contract to govern the procedure of indemnification in case of termination or nonrenewal of a contract. The
decree as finally promulgated referred only to a model contract for
could
dealings between clients and agencies, and that the committee
2
act as arbitrator of disputes between clients and agencies. 5
The committee proposed a form contract which was to govern in
the absence of other agreements.m While the contract did not accept
all the arguments of the industry, 7 it did adopt the idea that agencies
have a right to contracts of a certain duration. The form contract
provided that in absence of specific agreement or good cause, six
months notice should be given before termination, and that this notice
could not be given during the first six months of the contract. The
Committee seems to have assumed that termination of the contract
without cause and without proper notice could be the basis of a suit
for damages. While the Committee probably intended, when it set
up explicit provisions for termination, that indemnities between
agencies be abolished, it never expressly stated such a conclusion.
Furthermore, the contract is not mandatory. It would thus seem that
the Commission's recommendations in the Advertising case were
largely undercut by a governmental intervention, which only resulted
in the preparation of a mild suggested contract.
VII. ThE COMMISSION AND THE CoURTS
The cases which have arisen before the civil courts have been
concerned with the most direct effects of restrictive practices: damage
suits by companies which ententes have tried to put out of business
284. Id. at 223 (ministerial letter of June 25, 1959).
285. Order of Dec. 15, 1959, [1959] J.O. 12015.
286. [1961] J.O. 8633.
287. For a detailed examination of these problems and an outline of the industry's
arguments see Arrighi de Casanova, "L'indemnit6 de 'd6possession' dans les rapports
entre interm6diaires de publicit6," in Dix ans de conferences d'agr~gation, Etudes de
droit commercial offertes ti Joseph Hamel 459 (1961).
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by various unfair means and suits to enforce contracts setting up
ententes against members who contest their validity. There have
apparently been no actions brought by customers on the theory that
they have been charged an unreasonably high price.28
The cases in which recovery has been allowed against ententes
which have tried to drive competitors out of business are based on the
principle of freedom to engage in any commerce or industry which
was established by the law of 2-17 March 1791 and the general
development of the law of unfair competition on the basis of article
1382 of the Code Civil. The commentators and the cases vary in
emphasizing one or the other of these two bases. Probably the
most useful analysis rests on two ideas: that every entente, by its very
existence, limits the liberty of commerce and that the legality of the
entente should be decided in reference to the general theory of excess
and misuse of power.m
The practices of the entente among the railway repair shops, which
resulted in the elimination of eleven of the thirty-three members of
the entente, are typical of the abuses condemned by this body of
case law. When one of the eleven firms eliminated sued, the Cour
d'Appel of Paris declared
Considering that no matter how extensive the powers [of the trade

association] are, the defense of the interests of the industry cannot be
allowed to lead to the elimination of certain members to safeguard the
market of the others without being contrary to the liberty of commerce and

industry.=
The Court also referred to the Commission's opinionF91 as a confirmation of the fact that there had been an entente and it had brought
about the elimination of the Mariage Company. Article 59, however,
seems to have been of secondary importance as the 92case was largely
based on the traditional law of unfair competition.
Another group of cases concerned an agreement in the crayfish industry which granted to a group of wholesalers the exclusive right to
puchase two types of crayfish in exchange for guaranteeing the fishermen a minimum price. 3 In one of these, a wholesaler who had been
288. See fifth report 12.
289. See Teitgen, Note, [1960] Dr. soc. 455, 463.
290. S.A.R.L. Mariage v. Syndicat des r6parateurs de mat6riel roulant de chemins
de fer, Cour d'Appel de Paris, Nov. 4, 1959, [1960] J.C.P. 11.11488 (note R. Plaisant),
[1960] Gaz. Pal. I. 168, [1961] Annales de la propri6te industrielle 163.
291. Entente dans l'industrie de r6paration du mat6riel roulant ferroviaire, fourth
report 315.
292. Me Lussan, counsel for the Mariage Company, said that he had based his
arguments on art. 1382 of the Code Civil and that he felt that he could equally well
have won the case before the enactment of the French antitrust laws. Interview in
Paris, Sept. 11, 1964.
293. See also Entente pour l'organisation du march6 de la langouste, fourth report 318.
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refused membership and who thus could no longer obtain these two
types of crayfish was granted damages against the entente by the
Tribunal de Commerce of Quimper largely on the basis of a violation
of article 59.2

The Cour d'Appel of Rennes, however, expressly

refused to rely on article 59 and condemned the actions of the
entente as contrary to the liberty of the wholesaler to buy and sell.295
The Cour de Cassation based its opinion on similar reasoning and
affirmed, stating that the actions of the entente had made it impossible for nonmembers to get a supply of crayfish and thus to continue
their businesses.2
In suits to enforce the provisions of entente contracts, the courts
have necessarily had to consider article 59. Several lower court cases
have shown a great reluctance to hold contracts void and have given
article 59 an interpretation which is not far from that given to
article 419 of the Code P6nal.m Thus the Tribunal de Commerce of
the Seine found that an agreement for a common sales agency and
fixed prices was not designed to restrain competition or to affect the
price. 38 This decision can partially be explained by the fact that it
was handed down before the publication of any of the opinions of
the Commission.2 9 The Tribunal de Commerce of Rouen, however,
294. Locquin-Laurent v. Socidt6 "La Langouste," Tribunal de Commerce de Quimper,
Apr. 18, 1958 (unreported). The court said "Whereas the group, in exercising a
veritable monopoly uniquely in the interest of its members, in creating an advantage
for them, in blacklisting the specialized wholesalers and especially Locquin-Laurent,
cannot be considered as a good entente within the meaning of article 59 ter." The
court then slightly shifted the basis of its decision in, saying that the group therefore
had "unlawfully restrained the commercial liberty of Locquin-Laurent and thus had
unfairly competed."
295. Soci6t6 "La Langouste" v. Locquin-Laurent, Cour d'Appel de Rennes, Dec. 9,
1959, [1960] Dr. soc. 454 (note Teitgen). Teitgen characterized this case as yet
another example of the reluctance of French courts to apply those laws which must
be interpreted in the light of economic circumstances. Id. at 461.
296. Soci6t6 "La Langouste" v. Loequin-Laurent, Cour de Cassation (Ch. civ., sect.
com. Mar. 13, 1963, [1963] Bulletin des arrfts de la Cour de Cassation, chambres
civiles [hereinafter cited as Bull. civ.] III. 125, [1964] D.II.97 (note R. Plaisant),
[1964] Dr. soc. 72 (note Teitgen). For a case in which a person expelled from the
lobster entente recovered damages see LeBris v. Laurent, Cour de Cassation (Ch. civ.,
sect. com.), Mar. 13, 1963, [1963] Bull. civ. III 125, [1964] D.II.97 (note R. Plaisant),
[1964] Dr. soc. 72 (note Teitgen).
297. See note 16 supra.
298. Glacires & Frigorifiques de F6camp v. Glaci~res & Frigorifiques de rAlimentation, Tribunal de Commerce de la Seine, July 4, 1957 (unreported), rev'd, Cour d'Appel
de Paris, May 4, 1961, [1962] J.C.P. 11.12517 (note Gendrel & Lafarge), [1962]
Annales de la propri6t6 industrielle 124.
299. The first publication of the Commission's opinions was on Jan. 14, 1960. [1960]
J.0., Doc. adm. 1. The Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, however, gave a brief
summary of the Commission activities in 1957 in response to a question by a member
of the National Assembly. [1957] J.O. D6b. Parl., Ass. N. 4569-70.
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made a similar interpretation of article 59 in 1961. 300 The court found
that an agreement between two forwarding agencies which divided
the market, without making any mention of prices, "obviously did
not have as its intention to artificially increase prices." The court
added that there was a third agency in the town and that this fact
alone was enough to make untenable the idea that there was any
fraudulent intention or any offense of wrongfully restraining competition. Moreover, the court noted that none of the customers had
complained.
In several instances ententes have been examined both by the
Commission and the Cours d'Appel. In one, an association en participation had been formed between the manufacturers of sickles according to which profits and losses were shared among the members
according to fixed percentages. The prices were also fixed by a clause
which provided that for each item sold the manufacturer was considered to have received the full amount at which the item was listed
by the association, so that he would bear any discount he gave and
only receive a fixed percentage of the profits on that sale.
For purposes of comparison, the opinion of the Commission will
be considered first, although it was later chronologically. The Commission had little difficulty in condemning the entente for having
fixed prices and for having established a monopolistic scheme which
permitted it to impose the highest possible prices.30' It noted that
one of the manufacturers, M. Aug6, was in a position to sell at a
lower price. It was unimpressed by the measures of standardization,
which it said could have been caused by the general evolution of
industrial techniques rather than the action of the entente, and it
added that the closing of one of the three factories which were shut
down was probably inevitable because of the lack of skilled labor.
Although the Commission did not specifically ask for the liquidation
of the entente, the Minister's demand that the association be dissolved 302 was consistent with the Commission's recommendations.
The case arose before the courts in 1958 when M. Auge first requested to withdraw from the association en participation and then,
following the other members' refusal, brought suit to have the
association declared void on several grounds including the violation
of article 59. The Tribunal de Commerce of Saint-Etienne upheld
the validity of the entente.30 The Court considered that the fixing of
300. Soci6t6 de Transit & Transport Gabriel Faroult v. Soci6te de Transit & Transport
Jules Roy, Tribunal de Commerce de Rouen, July 21, 1961 (unreported but summary at
[1962] D. somm. 15.)
301. Entente entre fabricants de faulx et faucilles, fifth report 26.
302. Id. at 27 (ministerial decision).
303. Aug6 v. Etablissements Dorian-Holtzer, Jackson & Cie, Tribunal de Commerce
de Saint-Etienne, Sept. 17, 1958 (unreported).
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a common price by the members of a group that had achieved a
"commercial
and industrial unit" was not illegal and was "so natural"
that it could not see how anyone could find any fraudulent intent.
It added that the entente did not intend to increase prices or maintain
them artificially, but rather to avoid serious disorders which would
be prejudicial to the interests of the clients of this declining industry.
In the light of this characterization of the economic situation, the
case became a simple matter of contract law, and the court declared
that Aug6 must observe his contract.
The Cour d'Appel of Lyon, however, was not willing to dismiss
questions as to the entente's legality.304 It recognized that the agreement had practically eliminated all competition among the French
manufacturers. It did not feel, however, that it had sufficient information to decide whether the entente could be justified under article 59
ter and so appointed an expert to examine the economic situation of
the industry. The expert, M. Lucien Passot, did not consider his role
as limited to making a study of the legal and factual questions which
would then be presented to the court305 Following the court's wish,
he directed his efforts towards encouraging a settlement by assembling
the facts and presenting them to the parties in a series of meetings,
thus enabling the parties to predict the conclusions that the court
would draw and thereby encouraging them to settle. During this
period the expert also communicated with the Commission and was
invited to attend the meeting at which the Commission examined the
entente. He said that the Commission's condemnation of the entente
tended to confirm his opinion concerning the more apparent aspects
of the case, especially the association's monopoly position in France.
These conclusions were disclosed by M. Passot at his next meeting
with the parties.
M. Passot also found that M. Aug6 sold at prices which averaged ten
per cent less than the association's list and still managed to make
substantial profits. He stated that the other companies, in spite of
their greater size, "could now show (supposing that was easy) that
their costs were lower than those of Aug6, and most importantly of
all, with their higher prices the public obviously received no benefit
from the entente."306 Finally, with the mass of these facts, the four
companies which wanted to uphold the association en participation
realized that it was better to settle if only to limit their damages. By
304. Aug6 v. Establissements Dorian-Holtzer, Jackson et Cie, Cour d'Appel de Lyon,
June 13, 1960, [1961] J.C.P. U.12103 (note Boitard), [1961] D. II. 148 (note
Gor6), [1961] Recuiel Sirey 195.
305. Lucien Passot was kind enough to furnish us with this information. Letter,
Sept. 27, 1964.

306. Ibid.
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allowing M. Aug6 to withdraw, M. Passot stated that the association
was finally allowed to continue in spite of the fact that it still represented seventy-five per cent of the French production, because the
existence of a nonmember would prevent abusive price increases.
With the extreme complexity of the economic studies necessary to
reach a decision whether an entente is in violation of article 59 bis
and the lack of clearly defined standards, it is probably desirable
that courts appoint their own experts. This conclusion is especially
appropriate in the light of the limited scope of judicial investigations
in France. As M. Passot's examination actually developed, there was
no conflict with the decision of the Commission. This result, of
course, was partly caused by the fact that M. Passot considered that
his role was primarily to encourage a settlement.
The practice of courts to proceed independently, however, means
that there is a risk of conflicting interpretations of article 59. This
problem raises questions of what weight will be given to a decision
by the Commission in a later civil proceeding and whether the courts
should ask the Commission for its advice.
Article 59 bis says only:
Every undertaking or agreement relating to a practice thus prohibited is
void as a matter of law. This nullity may be asserted by the parties or

third persons; it cannot be asserted by the parties against third persons.

Should the occasion arise, the question of nullity is determined by the
courts of justice, to whom the advisory opinion of the commission, if one
has been rendered, must be communicated.

The first question is whether the courts should actively seek the
advice of the Commission or await its opinion when they know that it
is considering the same matter. The assistance which a court might
gain from such opinions, however, is limited by their brevity, and by
the tendency for the ministerial decisions to add specific conditions
or to reach slightly different conclusions. Although the courts do not
have power to bring a matter before the Commission, it would seem
most probable that such a request would be followed either by having
the Commission adopt the case on its own or by having the Minister
bring it before the Commission. In one instance the Commission
examined a case brought before it by the Minister for Economic
Affairs at the request of the Minister of Justicem after the consideration of the entente by a lower court. 3°8 The Cour d'Appel of Paris,
however, did not wait for the Commission's decision before deciding
307. Affaires "Ententes professionnelles dans le domaine de la publicit6," third
report 220.
308. Soci6t6 Agence Havas v. Soci6t6 Op6 ra Publicit6, Tribunal de Commerce de
la Seine, May 28, 1956 (unreported).
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the case. 30 9 This provoked a strong statement from the Commission
that, in the interest of the sound administration of justice, the Cour
d'Appel should at least have waited so that any differences would be
deliberate.310 It was willing to admit that the courts have the power
to make a completely independent determination of the legality of
an entente under article 59.
Reference of cases to the Commission by the courts would substantially delay the completion of judicial proceedings. The period
from the start of the administrative investigation until the ministerial
decision is rarely less than two years. 311 Probably the courts
should not wait except where the Commission has already rendered a
decision but the Minister has not reached a decision. Such a delay
would be relatively brief, and it would seem undesirable for a court
to consider the Commission's opinion without the ministerial decision.
In the Aug6312 case, the Cour d'Appel of Lyon did not wait for the
Commission's decision although it knew that an investigation was
under way.
Several courts have considered the relationship between the courts
and the Commission. While one court seems to have attached little
importance to the Commission's opinion, two have considered them
practically as res judicata. As has been pointed out, the Cour d'Appel
of Paris in the Mariage13 case granted damages although the Commission had approved the practices of the entente. Referring to the
Commission's opinion, it said only that "it is appropriate to state that
in the light of the opinion of the Commission technique des ententes
of November 21, 1958, the entente existed and contributed to the
elimination of the Mariage company."314 The court by this reference,
which at first seems to show agreement with the Commission, does not
indicate whether or not it had given the opinion any weight. The
question of how legality under article 59, however, seems to have
been of secondary importance.
Two cases considered the Commission's opinions binding, or at
least necessary for any justification under article 59 ter. These cases
show little awareness of the procedure before the Commission or of
309. Soci6t6 Agence Havas v. Soci6t6 Opera Publicit6, Cour d'Appel de Paris, Mar.
25, 1957 (unreported). The case is thus cited in PLASANr & LAssan, LEs nAPPOx
DE LA COMMISSION TECHNIQUE DES ENTMrrEs, ANNiES 1956 A 1959, [1962] D. chr. 31.

The clerk of courts, however, has no record of the case and Me. Tinaud, counsel to the
Agence Havas, has stated that the case was not appealed.
310. Third report 213.

311. See fourth report 304.
312. Aug6 v. Etablissements Dorain-Holtzer, Jackson et Cie, supra note 304.
313. S.A.R.L. Mariage v. Syndicat des r6parateurs de mat6riel roulant de chemins de
fer, supra note 290.
314. Ibid.
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the basic statute. In the Le Bris35 case the Cour d'Appel of Rennes
quickly resolved the question of legality of the entente. Since the
lower court decision, the Minister had adopted the conclusions of the
Commission and ordered that the entente be dissolved, and the court
declared that the Minister's act settled the question for the purpose
of the civil litigation. This interpretation seems directly contrary to
article 59 which says that the nullity of a prohibited practice "is determined by the courts of justice, to whom the advisory opinion of
the commission, if one has been rendered, must be communicated."
It also ignores the essentially advisory role of the Commission. Such an
interpretation, however, might allow review of the Minister's letter as
an act prejudicing the members of the entente. This theory was
apparently adopted by the entente in bringing an action before the
Tribunal Administratif of Rennes to annul the decision as exceeding
the Minister's power. The court, however, said:
Considering that only the judicial tribunals have jurisdiction to decide
the nullity of the entente either in civil suits between members of the entente
or with nonmembers, or in criminal proceedings; that the Minister's order
[to dissolve the entente] is not coupled with the threat of a sanction reviewable by the administrative courts; that consequently the order is not
a decison of the type reviewable
in a suit to annul the decision as exceeding
31 6
the Minister's authority.

In the Le Bris case the difference in interpretation of article 59
between the administrative and judicial courts was never resolved as
the Cour de Cassation
decided the appeal on a ground wholly inde3
17
59.
article
of
pendent
Possibly an even more dubious reading of article 59 was made by
the Cour d'Appel of Paris in the Glacieres 3 8 case, which held that an
entente was illegal under article 59 bis but refused to consider possible
justification under article 59 ter.
315. Soci6t6 "La Langouste" v. Le Bris, Cour d'Appel de Rennes, June 15, Ni 61,
[1961] Dr. soc. 459 (note Teitgen & Falconetti).
316. Soci6t6 "La Langouste," Tribunal Administratif de Rennes, Oct. 23, 1961,
[1964] Dr. soc. 74 (note Teitgen).
317. Le Bris v. Laurent, rupra note 296. The actual proceedings were more complicated since although the Cour d'Appel of Rennes held the entente illegal under
article 59, it refused damages on the ground that the plaintiff was claiming damages
for his expulsion from an illegal group and that no unfair competition had been shown.
It was thus the plaintiff who was appealing. The Cour de Cassation reversed since it
considered the damages claimed were for the actions of the entente after the plaintiff's
expulsion and it rejected the conclusion of the Cour d'Appel that there had been no
unfair competition. While it might thus seem that the Cour de Cassation approved the
finding of illegality on the basis of article 59, it seems clear from a reading of the
case and that of the companion case, Soci6t6 "La Langouste" v. Locquin-Laurent,
supra note 296, involving the same entente that the Cour de Cassation relied wholly
on theories of the liberty of commerce and unfair competition.
318. Glaciares & Frigorifiques de F6camp v. Glaci6res & Frigorifiques de 'Alimentation, supranote 298.
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If [the defendant] considered that in actuality the entente had intervened
for an essential end, as he alleged, the improvement of the distribution or
the development of economic progress, he must make these allegations
before the Commission technique des ententes, created for this purpose
by article 59 quater, that he has not done. 319

This interpretation makes it essential for an entente to seek the advice
of the Commission which would presumably then be considered binding; the case thus raises the same problems as the Le Brismo case. It
further completely ignores the fact that private parties have no right
to bring a case before the Commission. The interpretation, therefore,
leaves all ententes presumptively liable in civil damage suits with
only a hope of petitioning the Commission to examine the entente.
In conclusion it should be said that article 59 still has only a minor
importance in the cases. The suits against ententes because of the
elimination of a company from a market have been decided largely
independently of article 59. Moreover, while the principles elaborated
in these cases help to ensure a certain amount of commercial fair play,
they do little to protect competition in itself. Suits attempting to force
firms to respect the terms of a contract of an entente have necessarily
obliged courts to examine questions of validity of agreements under
article 59, but they have often resulted in highly questionable
opinions. Some of these problems are the inevitable result of courts
being faced with a new statute in an area that is also new. Two
facts however ought to be noted: there apparently have been no
suits by consumers to obtain damages for the actions of an entente
in increasing prices 321 and the damages awarded have been small. 3 2
Thus it could not be said that the fear of damage suits operates to
3
ensure compliance with the French antitrust laws. 23
VIII. CONCLUSION

An attempt to evaluate the accomplishments of the Commission
should be considered with reference both to the ententes which have
319. Ibid.
320. Soci6t6 "La Langouste" v. Le Bris, supranote 315.
321. See fifth report 12.
322. For example in the suits brought by the Mariage company, it received 10,000

francs in the first and 20,000 francs in the second, a recovery which the counsel for
Mariage considered as largely nominal. The most important result of the case was
that the Mariage company started to again receive orders from the French railways.
Interview, supra note 292.

323. The Cour de Cassation has held, moreover, in a case arising under Article 37
that private individuals cannot avail themselves of the rights, allowed under French
criminal law in certain circumstances, to start criminal proceedings or to join in a
criminal suit in order to recover their damages in the case of a violation of the basic
laws regulating prices. This law, as amended, contains articles 37 and 59. Nicolas,
Soci6t6 Brandt et Soci6t6 Photo Radio Club, Cour de Cassation (Ch. Grim.), July 11,
1962, [1962) Bull. crim. 504, [1962] D. II 497, [19621 J.C.P, U.12799.
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actually been examined and to the Frence economy as a whole.
The Commission's opinions show that it has gradually begun to
develop a coherent policy toward ententes. Those contained in the
fifth report are especially important in this respect since in these
cases it seems to have been less willing to admit than an entente has
contributed to economic progress and it has taken a firmer position
concerning such practices as324rebate cartels and the use of penalties to
enforce restrictive practices.
It should be stressed, however, that the Commission's disapprovals
have been limited to the most restrictive types of arrangements, and
that many of the programs which the Commission believes to be
favorable to economic progress, such as specialization agreements and
the co-ordination of research efforts, restrain competition. Moreover,
the establishment of these programs means that interindustry meetings will be increased and that more opportunities for the setting up
of restrictive practices will be provided. On the whole, it would seem
that the commission's recommendations have done little to increase
competition in the industries which it has examined. The cases before
the civil courts would seem to have had even less effect.
In industries which have not been directly touched by the Commission's investigations, the French antitrust laws seem to be little
known, often ignored and easily evaded. Except for those persons
directly concerned with the questions of ententes such as the directors
of trade associations, few lawyers or businessmen have any knowledge
of these laws. The antitrust laws have been disregarded in two ways.
First, the following rationalization seems quite prevalent: since there
is in practice neither a real threat of criminal penalties nor a risk of
substantial civil liability, there is no need to eliminate restrictive
practices before the Commission has made an investigation. Second,
even those persons who are well aware of the antitrust laws and
who declare that ententes should be absolutely legal (and that the
contracts establishing them should be legally binding upon members)
are not concerned by the fact that particular practices which they are
using have been specifically condemned by the Commission. They
believe that the ways in which their ententes are contributing to
economic progress will surely be sufficient to assure their ultimate
justification under article 59 ter.
Finally, a reading of the Commission's opinions themselves suggests
various ways to evade the antitrust laws. For example, the importance
that the Commission seems to have attributed to the existence of
324. The Second Copper Products case, however, does represent a retreat as the
Commission admitted all the restrictive practices apparently because the industry seemed
to be sufficiently modem and progressive. Ententes entre fabricants de demi-produits
en m6taux cuivreux, Mar. 22, 1963.
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patent rights and its failure to examine associations en participation
in certain cases would suggest that ententes could be set up under
these forms. It could also be asked whether the Commission will
disapprove other more or less sophisticated types of ententes such as
open price systems which have begun to be introduced in France.
Many of these criticisms, such as the fact that the Commission has
not really faced the problems raised by some of the more complicated
types of ententes, reflect the inevitable difficulties in the elaboration
of a type of law that is completely new in France. More serious,
however, is the lack of a real threat of criminal or civil liability.
Here the worst of solutions seems to have been chosen, that is, not
making a clear choice between a system of repression and one of control of restrictive practices. An antitrust law which is based on the
exemplary effect of a certain number of decisions should contain a
substantial threat of civil liability or criminal penalties to encourage
businessmen to find out about the law and follow it.
A system which is based on control should have some system of
notification which would give the body applying the laws a knowledge
of the number and nature of ententes. Furthermore, a system of
control, it would seem, should have some streamlined procedure which
would allow a fairly rapid review of restrictive practices. The time
consuming procedure of investigations by the Commission which often
have to be repeated to adjust to changes in an industry would seem
inappropriate for a system of control.

